All notes for Subtopic 602.08000 – Duty to Bargain Effects
| Decision | Description | PERC Vol. | PERC Index | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2915Ha |
Trustees of the California State University
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Faculty union established the right to bargain over reasonably foreseeable health and safety effects of a student vaccination policy. Faculty union therefore has the option to demand such negotiations. (pp. 19 & 28.) more or view all topics or full text. |
50 | 148 | 04/10/26 |
| 2915Ha |
Trustees of the California State University
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
To conform PERB precedent to the court’s holding in Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90, that “an employer may satisfy its duty to seek clarification either ‘at the bargaining table’—that is, by formally meeting and conferring—or through an informal exchange between parties” (id. at p. 114), PERB clarified any contrary suggestions found in the following decisions: Rio Hondo Community College District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2313, p. 12; City of Palo Alto (2017) PERB Decision No. 2388a-M, p. 34; and County of Orange (2018) PERB Decision No. 2594-M, p. 27. The Board noted, however, that City of Palo Alto, supra, PERB Decision No. 2388a-M remains correct in holding that an employer cannot comply with its duty merely via comments at a public meeting of the employer’s governing board. (Id. at p. 34.) (p. 27 & fn. 10.) more or view all topics or full text. |
50 | 148 | 04/10/26 |
| 2915Ha |
Trustees of the California State University
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
When an employer, having reached a decision that falls outside the scope of bargaining, believes in good faith that its decision has no reasonably foreseeable effects on terms and conditions of employment, “before refusing to negotiate, [the] employer must attempt to clarify through discussions with the union any uncertainty as to what is proposed for bargaining and whether it falls within the scope of representation.” (Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90, 112 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted].) Indeed, “[r]efusing an effects bargaining demand without first attempting to clarify ambiguities and[/]or whether matters proposed for bargaining fall within the scope of representation, violates the duty to bargain in good faith.” (Ibid. [citations and internal quotation marks omitted].) The court clarified that “an employer may satisfy its duty to seek clarification either ‘at the bargaining table’—that is, by formally meeting and conferring—or through an informal exchange between parties.” (Id. at p. 114 [emphasis in original].) Just as an employer acts at its peril if it mistakenly refuses to bargain over a bargainable decision (or bargainable effects), a union acts at its peril if, as here: (1) an employer’s decision falls outside the scope of representation but has bargainable effects; (2) the employer, acting on a good faith doubt as to whether there are bargainable effects, seeks a clarification meeting; and (3) the union refuses to meet because it believes the employer has already commenced implementation, but the union ultimately fails to prove the employer had in fact done so. (pp. 26-28 & fn. 11.) more or view all topics or full text. |
50 | 148 | 04/10/26 |
| 2915Ha |
Trustees of the California State University
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even if a union gains actual notice of an employer’s non-bargainable decision, and the employer has not yet begun to implement its decision as of the date the union obtains such notice, the employer must still comply with its pre-implementation duty to bargain over any reasonably foreseeable effects on terms and conditions of employment. Normally, this means bargaining in good faith to impasse or agreement before beginning implementation. (County of Santa Clara (2021) PERB Decision No. 2799-M, p. 25 [“An employer normally may not implement the decision while effects bargaining continues and instead must wait until the parties have reached agreement or impasse over the negotiable effects of the decision”].) (pp. 25-26.) more or view all topics or full text. |
50 | 148 | 04/10/26 |
| 2915Ha |
Trustees of the California State University
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Irrespective of whether an employer provides formal notice or relies on actual notice, such notice is only adequate (sometimes referred to as “sufficient” or “reasonable”) if: (1) the person receiving formal notice or obtaining actual notice is a union official with authority to act on behalf of the organization on the matter in question; (2) the union official recognizes, or reasonably should recognize, the change in or potential impact on a bargainable topic; and (3) there remains sufficient time for the union to consult with bargaining unit members, formulate a plan of action, draft information requests and receive responses, craft counterarguments and/or proposals, and bargain in good faith to impact or agreement before the employer reaches a firm decision (for bargainable decisions) or begins implementation (for decisions outside the scope of representation that have bargainable effects). Thus, the amount of notice that is sufficient will necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case, and parties would do well to err on the side of caution rather than assuming that only a particular amount of time is all that the law requires. (pp. 23-24.) Although insufficient notice is an element of the prima facie case, and therefore part of the charging party’s burden for proving a unilateral change allegation, where the facts demonstrate, or the employer admits, that no formal notice was provided to the representative, the burden is the employer’s to prove its affirmative defense of waiver, and not the union’s to prove lack of notice as part of its prima facie case. However, if the employer establishes that the union obtained actual notice, the union has the burden of proof as to the temporal sufficiency or insufficiency of such actual notice. (pp. 24-25.) more or view all topics or full text. |
50 | 148 | 04/10/26 |
| 2915Ha |
Trustees of the California State University
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
California State University claimed that it could address all relevant effects and implementation issues of relaxed student immunization policy as part of accommodating individual faculty members with disabilities. In reviewing this matter, the appellate court rejected this argument, noting that “laws prohibiting discrimination do not preclude enforcement of the right to be free from discrimination through the collective bargaining process.” (Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 [collecting cases].) (p. 19.) more or view all topics or full text. |
50 | 148 | 04/10/26 |
| 2915Ha |
Trustees of the California State University
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Decisions with reasonably foreseeable impacts on employee health or safety are a quintessential example of decisions that trigger an obligation to engage in effects bargaining. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 276-277; Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System (2012) PERB Decision No. 2298-M, p. 19.) Indeed, “where human health and safety are involved,” we should err on the side of finding a change is material enough to trigger bargaining even if it “will affect only a few employees.” (Solano County Employees’ Assn. v. County of Solano (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 256, 262 (Solano).) Notably, Solano held this is true even when management seeks to make the workplace safer, over the union’s objection. (Ibid.) (p. 15.) more or view all topics or full text. |
50 | 148 | 04/10/26 |
| 2915Ha |
Trustees of the California State University
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
“If a proposal is outside the scope of representation and does not have negotiable effects, the employer may refuse to negotiate without committing an unfair practice. (City of Pinole (2012) PERB Dec. No. 2288-M, p. 7.) However, a party’s refusal to discuss a proposal based on an incorrect belief that the proposal concerns a matter outside of the scope of representation is a per se violation of the duty to bargain. (County of San Luis Obispo (2015) PERB Dec. No. 2427-M, p. 26.)” (Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90, 104.) (pp. 13-14.) more or view all topics or full text. |
50 | 148 | 04/10/26 |
| 0715E |
Lake Elsinore School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Board dismissed charge alleging that district failed to give notice and the opportunity to bargain the negotiable effects of the district's nonnegotiable decision to reduce of hours of instructional aides. No duty to bargain effects caused by reduction in aide time as main purpose of instructional aides hired under School Improvement Project was the maximization of direct instructional assistance of students. more or view all topics or full text. |
13 | 20027 | 12/29/88 |
| 0646E |
Lake Elsinore School District * * * OVERRULED by State of California (Department of Agriculture) (2002) PERB Decision No. 1473-S
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
* * * OVERRULED IN PART ON OTHER GROUNDS by State of California (Department of Agriculture) (2002) PERB Decision No. 1473-S. * * *
District had no duty to provide the exclusive representative of certificated unit notice and an opportunity to negotiate possible effects of decision to reduce hours of members of the classified unit (instructional aides funded through the School Improvement Program ("SIP")). SIP aides were there to provide individualized instruction to students, not to function as personal assistants to teachers. Any diminishing of teachers' preparation time as result of reduction of aide time was, at best, a fortuitous side effect of misuse of the program. Increase in prep time may have resulted from factors other than decrease in aide time. Reduction in SIP aide time would only have an indirect and speculative impact on teachers workday. more or view all topics or full text. |
12 | 19012 | 12/18/87 |
| 2939E |
Rocklin Unified School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even when an employer has no obligation to bargain over a particular decision, it nonetheless must provide notice and an opportunity to bargain in good faith over any reasonably foreseeable effects the decision may have on matters within the scope of representation. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, pp. 11-12.) A failure or refusal to bargain over the effects of a non-negotiable change is equally as harmful as a failure to bargain over a negotiable change, as it disrupts and destabilizes employer-employee relations by creating an imbalance in the power between management and employee organizations. (County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, pp. 22-24.) In other words, the effects bargaining obligation is not an inferior duty. (The Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Decision No. 2855, p. 11.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 129 | 01/28/25 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H, which held if employer establishes union obtained actual notice of a decision with bargainable effects, the burden is on the union if it claims there was insufficient time for good faith negotiations before the employer began implementation.
Victor Valley Union High School District (1986) PERB Decision No. 565 (Victor Valley), which arose in a decision bargaining context, interwove analysis of what constitutes adequate notice from an employer and what constitutes adequate actual knowledge in lieu of notice from the employer. (Id. at pp. 4-6.) County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M explained how these concepts apply if an employer has a duty to bargain over effects and implementation rather than over the decision itself. (Id. at pp. 30-32.) In either a decision bargaining or effects bargaining context, two points are critical. The first relates to burdens of proof. While a charging party union has the burden to prove that the employer failed to provide adequate advance notice and/or opportunity to bargain, if the employer seeks to rely on the union’s “actual knowledge” in lieu of formal notice, the employer must do so as part of a waiver defense for which it bears the burden of proof. (City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M, pp. 38 & 40 (Sacramento).) Second, the Board has logically and properly interpreted Victor Valley, supra, PERB Decision No. 565 as making the requirements attendant to an actual knowledge showing no less stringent than the requirements when an employer provides formal notice to a union. Thus, to prove a union’s actual knowledge, the employer must show that such actual knowledge satisfied each element of effective notice set forth in Victor Valley, meaning that the union official with actual knowledge must: (1) have authority to act; (2) know of those aspects of the decision that have bargainable effects; and (3) possess the knowledge sufficiently in advance of a firm decision to allow good faith decisional bargaining or sufficiently in advance of implementation to allow for good faith effects bargaining. (Sacramento, supra, pp. 28-42; Victor Valley, supra, at pp. 5-6; accord El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. County of El Dorado (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 950, 956-957; San Diego Adult Educators v. PERB (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1124, 1136.) (pp. 24-25.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H, which held if employer establishes union obtained actual notice of a decision with bargainable effects, the burden is on the union if it claims there was insufficient time for good faith negotiations before the employer began implementation.
County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M (Santa Clara) overruled multiple decisions that mistakenly required a union to demand effects bargaining whenever it gained “actual knowledge” (also known as “actual notice”) of an employer decision, even if implementation was already underway. (Id. at pp. 26-32; see also City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M, pp. 17 & 38 (Sacramento) [explaining Santa Clara’s import].) After Santa Clara and Sacramento, there remains only a narrow path for an employer, after failing to afford a union notice, to rely on the fact that a union official nonetheless gained actual knowledge of the decision. Specifically, as part of an affirmative defense asserting that a union clearly and unmistakably waived its right to bargain, the employer must show that a union official with authority to act obtained full, timely, actual knowledge of the decision not only before the employer began implementation, but also with sufficient time to allow good faith bargaining before implementation. (Santa Clara, supra, pp. 28-29 [citing Victor Valley Union High School District (1986) PERB Decision No. 565, pp. 4-6]; accord Sacramento, supra, pp. 38-42.) (p. 24.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H.
Where a decision on a non-mandatory topic has bargainable effects and the employer begins implementing its decision without providing clear notice regarding the nature and scope of the change, the employer has at that point violated its bargaining duty and the union generally has no duty to request bargaining. (County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, p. 30 (Santa Clara); see also Oakland Unified School District (2023) PERB Decision No. 2875, p. 19 [union had no duty to bargain effects because employer had already begun implementing its decision].) An employer frustrates good faith negotiations if it begins implementation before bargaining. (Santa Clara, supra, p. 24 [bargaining “from a hole” is futile]; accord effects negotiations, before implementation begins. (Oakland Unified School District (2023) PERB Decision No. 2875, p. 18; City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M, p. 41.) (pp. 23-24.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H.
The Board expressly overruled Fremont Union High School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 651, p. 25 (Fremont), to the extent it suggests that effects are only bargainable if they are “reasonably certain to occur.” While Fremont had employed the phrase “reasonably certain to occur” in distinguishing between “actual” and “purely speculative” effects (id. at pp. 25-27), PERB later overruled that entire framework, clarifying that a charging party need only demonstrate that there are “reasonably foreseeable” effects rather than “actual” ones. (pp. 20-21.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H.
Faculty association presented sufficient evidence to show that student immunization policy had a reasonably foreseeable impact on faculty health and safety. Expert sources made clear why a student vaccine policy can have a reasonably foreseeable impact on faculty health. The policy change had the reasonably foreseeable result of reducing community immunity. Immunocompromised faculty or those faculty for whom a vaccine may be contraindicated rely heavily on community immunity. In effects bargaining, the parties might reach agreement on issues or policies, such as affording preference for virtual or hybrid teaching assignments to immunocompromised faculty, either at all times or in the event of a disease outbreak in a nearby community. Although faculty have individual rights to seek a reasonable accommodation, this argument favors the faculty association, as reasonable accommodation processes are part of a union’s scope of representation. (Sonoma County Superior Court (2017) PERB Decision No. 2532-C, p. 46, fn. 7; Sonoma County Superior Court (2015) PERB Decision No. 2409-C, p. 22.) Moreover, even when parties are unable to reach agreement, there are benefits to bargaining over fraught issues. (County of San Joaquin (2021) PERB Decision No. 2761-M, p. 69.) (pp. 17-22.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H.
Effects bargaining analysis requires determination of whether the effects fall within the scope of bargaining. Reasonably foreseeable health or safety effects are bargainable. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 276-277 [where city faced a budget crisis and decided to lay off firefighters, it had no duty to bargain over that decision but had to bargain over effects such as the safety of remaining firefighters].) If “human health and safety are involved,” PERB must err on the side of finding a change is material enough to trigger bargaining even if it “will affect only a few employees.” (Solano County Employees’ Assn. v. County of Solano (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 256, 262 (Solano).) Solano held this is true even when management seeks to make the workplace safer, over the union’s objection. (Ibid.) The principle holds even more sway where it is the union that espouses the more cautious position. (pp. 16-17.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H.
PERB uses the word “effects” as shorthand for the broad category that comprises both the effects and implementation of a decision on a non-mandatory bargaining subject. (Oakland Unified School District (2023) PERB Decision No. 2875, p. 10.) Negotiations over implementation may include negotiations over potential alternatives or revisions that may mitigate or offset the impact of the decision on employees, even though the decision itself is not bargainable. (Id. at p. 11.) For instance, even though an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to lay off employees, the California Supreme Court has noted that the scope of required effects bargaining includes “the timing of layoffs and the number and identity of the employees affected.” (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 265 & 276.) This means that even after an employer has decided to lay off a set number of bargaining unit employees in specific titles, a union has a right to propose alternatives during effects negotiations. As an example, the union may propose to lessen the number of bargaining unit layoffs and instead achieve desired labor cost savings by laying off non-bargaining unit employees, saving money on wages or benefits, or other similar proposals. (p. 15.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H.
In Compton Community College District (1989) PERB Decision No. 720, the Board held that an employer may implement a decision on a non-mandatory subject prior to exhausting its effects bargaining obligation if: (1) the implementation date is based on an immutable deadline or an important managerial interest, such that a delay in implementation beyond the date chosen would effectively undermine the employer’s right to make the decision; (2) the employer gives sufficient advance notice of the decision and implementation date to allow for meaningful negotiations prior to implementation; and (3) the employer negotiates in good faith prior to implementation and continues to negotiate afterwards as to the subjects that were not resolved by virtue of implementation. (Id. at pp. 14-15.) (pp. 14-15.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2915H |
Trustees of the California State University * * * PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
PARTIALLY VACATED AND PARTIALLY SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS BY Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90 and Trustees of the California State University (2026) PERB Decision No. 2915a-H.
Even where a decision involves a non-mandatory bargaining topic, if the decision has reasonably foreseeable effects on exclusively represented employees’ terms and conditions of employment, then the employer has a bargaining obligation regarding the decision’s effects and implementation. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 265 & 276; Regents of the University of California (2021) PERB Decision No. 2783-H, pp. 28-29.) Accordingly, if an employer reaches a firm decision on a matter outside the scope of representation and the decision has reasonably foreseeable effects on represented employees, then the employer typically must afford the exclusive representative notice and a meaningful opportunity to engage in effects negotiations, before implementation begins. (Oakland Unified School District (2023) PERB Decision No. 2875, p. 18; City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M, pp. 2, 17-19 & 28-42; County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, p. 30.) (pp. 14 & 22.) more or view all topics or full text. |
49 | 45 | 08/19/24 |
| 2900M |
* * * JUDICIAL APPEAL PENDING * * * County of Santa Clara
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Irrespective of whether a decision falls within the scope of representation, if the decision has reasonably foreseeable effects on represented employees’ terms and conditions of employment, the employer must provide adequate advance notice and opportunity to bargain in good faith over the decision’s implementation and effects. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 265 & 276 (Richmond Firefighters).) PERB uses the word “effects” as shorthand for the broad category that comprises both the effects and implementation of a decision on a non-mandatory bargaining subject. (Oakland Unified School District (2023) PERB Decision No. 2875, p. 10 (Oakland).) Negotiations over implementation typically include proposed alternatives. (Id. at p. 11.) For instance, even though an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to lay off employees, the California Supreme Court has noted that the scope of required effects bargaining includes “the timing of layoffs and the number and identity of the employees affected.” (Richmond Firefighters, supra, at pp. 265, 276.) Thus, one purpose of effects bargaining is to permit the exclusive representative an opportunity to persuade the employer to consider alternatives that may diminish the impact of the decision on employees. (Oakland, supra, p. 11.) Effects bargaining violations are equally harmful as decision bargaining violations, as each disrupts and destabilizes employer-employee relations. In other words, the effects bargaining obligation is not an inferior duty. (Ibid.) (p. 22.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 169 | 04/23/24 |
| 2881E |
West Contra Costa Unified School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the new assignment procedures were no more than effects of a decision involving a non-mandatory topic of bargaining, there is no tenable argument that the District complied with Compton Community College District (1989) PERB Decision No. 720 (Compton), which allows an employer to implement its decision before completing effects negotiations if it can establish each of three elements: (1) the implementation date was based on an immutable deadline or an important managerial interest, such that a delay in implementation beyond the date chosen would effectively undermine the employer’s right to make the decision; (2) the employer gave sufficient advance notice of the decision and implementation date to allow for meaningful negotiations prior to implementation; and (3) the employer negotiated in good faith prior to and after implementation. (Id. at pp. 14-15.) Indeed, even if the first element were satisfied, the District did not show that it provided advance notice, much less with sufficient time to allow meaningful pre-implementation negotiations. The District therefore cannot establish the second and third Compton elements. (p. 17, fn. 12.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 79 | 11/06/23 |
| 2868M |
El Camino Healthcare District, El Camino Hospital, and Silicon Valley Medical Development, LLC
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even when an employer has no obligation to bargain over a decision, it must provide notice and an opportunity to meet and confer over any reasonably foreseeable effects the decision may have on matters within the scope of representation. (County of Santa Clara (2021) PERB Decision No. 2799-M, pp. 24-25.) An employer normally may not implement the decision while effects bargaining continues and instead must wait until the parties have reached agreement or impasse over the negotiable effects of the decision. (Id. at p. 25.) The employer violates its duty to bargain if it fails to provide adequate advance notice, and in such circumstances the union need not ask to bargain effects as a prerequisite to filing an unfair practice charge. (Ibid.) However, where an employer does provide adequate notice, the union must request to bargain any reasonably foreseeable effects on negotiable matters. (Ibid.) The union’s request to bargain need not be formalistic or burdensome, nor anticipate every imaginable effect a proposed change may have, but rather must only identify negotiable areas of impact, thereby placing the employer on notice that it believes the employer’s proposed decision would affect one or more negotiable topics. (Ibid.) (pp. 57-58.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 36 | 08/15/23 |
| 2875E |
Oakland Unified School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
The Board rejected the District’s argument that it complied with Compton Community College District (1989) PERB Decision No. 720 (Compton), which allows an employer to implement its decision before completing effects negotiations if it can establish each of three elements: (1) the implementation date was based on an immutable deadline or an important managerial interest, such that a delay in implementation beyond the date chosen would effectively undermine the employer’s right to make the decision; (2) the employer gave sufficient advance notice of the decision and implementation date to allow for meaningful negotiations prior to implementation; and (3) the employer negotiated in good faith prior to and after implementation. (Id. at pp. 14-15.) Even assuming for the sake of argument that the District could satisfy the first element, the District did not show that it provided advance notice, much less with sufficient time to allow meaningful pre-implementation negotiations. The District therefore could not establish the second and third Compton elements. (pp. 20-21.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 64 | 10/16/23 |
| 2875E |
Oakland Unified School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
In an effects bargaining case, the threshold issue is whether the employer provided adequate advance notice to allow meaningful negotiations before implementation. Absent adequate notice, a union has a valid unfair practice charge irrespective of whether it requests to bargain effects. (County of Ventura (2021) PERB Decision No. 2758-M, p. 42.) To trigger a union’s obligation to request bargaining, the employer must provide notice that “clearly” informs the union of the nature and scope of the change. (Id. at p. 43.) (p. 18.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 64 | 10/16/23 |
| 2875E |
Oakland Unified School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Effects bargaining violations are equally harmful as decision bargaining violations, as each disrupts and destabilizes employer-employee relations by creating an imbalance in the power between management and employee organizations. (The Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Decision No. 2855, p. 17.) In other words, the effects bargaining obligation is not an inferior duty. (Ibid.) (p. 11.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 64 | 10/16/23 |
| 2875E |
Oakland Unified School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
The Board uses the word “effects” as shorthand for a broad category that comprises both the effects and implementation of a decision on a non-mandatory bargaining subject. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 265, 276 (Richmond Fire Fighters); City of Glendale (2020) PERB Decision No. 2694-M, p. 54, fn. 12; County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, p. 12; City of Palo Alto (2017) PERB Decision No. 2388a-M, p. 40; County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, p. 25, fn. 16; Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System (2012) PERB Decision No. 2298-M, pp. 6, 12, 14, 16-17, 20 & 22.) Negotiations over implementation typically include proposed alternatives. (The Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Decision No. 2855, p. 14, fn. 8 (Accelerated Schools); Oxnard Union High School District (2022) PERB Decision No. 2803, p. 52 (Oxnard).) For instance, even though an employer has no duty to bargain over a decision to lay off employees, the California Supreme Court has noted the scope of required effects bargaining includes “the timing of layoffs and the number and identity of the employees affected.” (Richmond Firefighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 265, 276.) Thus, one purpose of effects bargaining is to permit the exclusive representative an opportunity to persuade the employer to consider alternatives that may diminish the impact of the decision on employees. (Accelerated Schools, supra, p. 14, fn. 8; Oxnard, supra, p. 52.) (pp. 10-11.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 64 | 10/16/23 |
| 2876M |
* * * JUDICIAL APPEAL PENDING * * * County of Santa Clara
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
In the absence of advance notice, Unions had no duty to demand negotiations over effects of County’s decision to temporarily scale back services at certain clinics, and the County cannot assert waiver as a defense. (Oxnard Union High School District (2022) PERB Decision No. 2803, p. 51; County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, p. 30.) (p. 31.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 66 | 10/17/23 |
| 2876M |
* * * JUDICIAL APPEAL PENDING * * * County of Santa Clara
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
The MMBA’s duty to bargain in good faith extends to the implementation and effects of a decision that has a foreseeable effect on matters within the scope of representation, even where the decision itself falls outside the scope. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, pp. 11-12.) Thus, even when an employer has no obligation to bargain over a particular decision, it nonetheless must provide notice and an opportunity to meet and confer over any reasonably foreseeable effects the decision may have on matters within the scope of representation. (Ibid.) The employer violates its duty to bargain if it fails to provide adequate advance notice, and in such circumstances the union need not demand to bargain effects as a prerequisite to filing an unfair practice charge. (Id. at p. 12.) PERB uses the word “effects” as shorthand for a broad category that comprises both the effects and implementation of a decision on a nonmandatory bargaining subject. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 276; City of Glendale (2020) PERB Decision No. 2694-M, p. 54, fn. 12; County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, p. 12; City of Palo Alto (2017) PERB Decision No. 2388a-M, p. 40; County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, p. 25, fn. 16.) Negotiations over implementation typically include proposed alternatives. (The Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Decision No. 2855, p. 14, fn. 8; Oxnard Union High School District (2022) PERB Decision No. 2803, p. 52; County of Santa Clara (2021) PERB Decision No. 2799-M, p. 27.) (pp. 30-31.) more or view all topics or full text. |
48 | 66 | 10/17/23 |
| 2799M |
County of Santa Clara
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
While an employer need not negotiate over a decision that is outside the scope of representation, it nonetheless must meet and confer over alternatives to the decision as part of effects bargaining. (County of Sonoma (2021) PERB Decision No. 2772-M, p. 54 (Sonoma); Anaheim Union High School District (2016) PERB Decision No. 2504, pp. 10-11, 15 & adopting proposed decision at p. 41; City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M, p. 22.) Thus, one purpose of effects bargaining is to permit the exclusive representative an opportunity to persuade the employer to consider alternatives that may diminish the impact of the decision on employees. (Sonoma, supra, PERB Decision No. 2772-M, p. 55.) County failed to bargain in good faith over consequences for surveillance technology ordinance violations where it refused to respond to the Association’s proposed alternatives, such as exempting Association members from the criminal provision, or explaining why traditional disciplinary measures were not adequate to address ordinance violations. more or view all topics or full text. |
46 | 94 | 12/20/21 |
| 2799M |
County of Santa Clara
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even when an employer has no obligation to bargain over a particular decision, it nonetheless must provide notice and an opportunity to meet and confer over any reasonably foreseeable effects the decision may have on matters within the scope of representation. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, pp. 11-12.) The employer violates its duty to bargain if it fails to provide adequate advance notice, and in such circumstances the union need not demand to bargain effects as a prerequisite to filing an unfair practice charge. (County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, pp. 30-32.) However, where an employer does provide adequate notice, the union must request to bargain any reasonably foreseeable effects on negotiable matters. (Id. at p. 30.) The union’s request to bargain need not be formalistic or burdensome, nor anticipate every imaginable effect a proposed change may have, but rather must only identify negotiable areas of impact, thereby placing the employer on notice that it believes the employer’s proposed decision would affect one or more negotiable topics. (County of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2315-M, p. 9.) more or view all topics or full text. |
46 | 94 | 12/20/21 |
| 2803E |
Oxnard Union High School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Where an employer has an obligation to meet and confer over reasonably foreseeable effects a decision, an employer may implement its decision before completing effects bargaining if it can establish each of three elements: (1) the implementation date was based on an immutable deadline or an important managerial interest, such that a delay in implementation beyond the date chosen would effectively undermine the employer’s right to make the decision; (2) the employer gave sufficient advance notice of the decision and implementation date to allow for meaningful negotiations prior to implementation; and (3) the employer negotiated in good faith prior to and after implementation. (Compton Community College District (1989) PERB Decision No. 720, pp. 14-15.) more or view all topics or full text. |
46 | 110 | 01/26/22 |
| 2803E |
Oxnard Union High School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even when an employer has no obligation to bargain over a particular decision, it nonetheless must provide notice and an opportunity to meet and confer over any reasonably foreseeable effects the decision may have on matters within the scope of representation. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, pp. 11-12.) The employer violates this duty if it fails to provide adequate advance notice, and in such circumstances the union need not request to bargain effects as a prerequisite to filing an unfair practice charge. (County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Decision No. 2321-M, pp. 30-32.) However, where an employer does provide adequate notice, the union must request to bargain any reasonably foreseeable effects on negotiable matters. (Id. at p. 30.) The union’s request to bargain need not be formalistic or burdensome, nor anticipate every imaginable effect a proposed change may have, but must only identify negotiable areas of impact, thereby placing the employer on notice that it believes the employer’s proposed decision would affect one or more negotiable topics. (County of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2315-M, p. 9; Rio Hondo Community College District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2313, p. 13.) more or view all topics or full text. |
46 | 110 | 01/26/22 |
| 2803E |
Oxnard Union High School District
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
An employer must meet and confer over alternatives to the decision as part of effects bargaining. (County of Sonoma (2021) PERB Decision No. 2772-M, p. 54 (Sonoma); Anaheim Union High School District (2016) PERB Decision No. 2504, pp. 10-11, 15 & adopting proposed decision at p. 41; City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2351-M, p. 22.) Thus, one purpose of effects bargaining is to permit the exclusive representative an opportunity to persuade the employer to consider alternatives that may diminish the impact of the decision on employees. (Sonoma, supra, PERB Decision No. 2772-M, p. 55.) more or view all topics or full text. |
46 | 110 | 01/26/22 |
| 2783H |
Regents of the University of California
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Before implementing a non-negotiable change, the parties must first negotiate over aspects of the change that impact matters within the scope of representation. Once a firm non-negotiable decision is made, the employer must “provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the reasonably foreseeable effects of its decision before implementation, just as it would be required to do before making a decision on a mandatory subject of bargaining.” (p. 28.) more or view all topics or full text. |
46 | 38 | 07/26/21 |
| 2772M |
County of Sonoma * * * VACATED IN PART by County of Sonoma (2023) PERB Decision No. 2772a-M * * *
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
* * * VACATED IN PART on other grounds by County of Sonoma (2023) PERB Decision No. 2772a-M * * *
Effects bargaining contemplates that negotiations may ultimately cause the employer to change its mind about the non-negotiable decision in some way. Because the Associations’ ability to propose alternatives to the County Board of Supervisors’ decision vanished as soon as it placed the ballot measure on the ballot, the County violated the statutory duty to meet and confer. (p. 54.) more or view all topics or full text. |
46 | 8 | 06/23/21 |
| 2761M |
County of San Joaquin
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Advance notice and bargaining are the primary means by which the MMBA promotes its central purpose—communication—and would lead to greater understanding and harmony going forward. Work opportunities, hours, and mandatory furlough periods are within the scope of representation. (See, e.g., Modoc County Office of Education (2019) PERB Decision No. 2684, p. 10; City of Long Beach (2012) PERB Decision No. 2296-M, p. 23; County of Fresno (2010) PERB Decision No. 2125-M, adopting warning letter at p. 3.) A decision to contract with a striker replacement company had foreseeable effects on these mandatory subjects of bargaining. The employer therefore was required to provide notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the reasonably foreseeable effects of its decision before implementation. (County of Santa Clara (2019) PERB Decision No. 2680-M, p. 12.) more or view all topics or full text. |
45 | 92 | 04/12/21 |
| 2610H |
Regents of the University of California (Berkeley)
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even if the University’s subcontracting decision was not itself negotiable, the University nonetheless had an obligation to provide notice and opportunity to bargain over negotiable effects before implementation. Because University failed to provide adequate notice of and opportunity to bargain over its decision to subcontract the Young Musician’s Program, it necessarily also failed to provide adequate notice and opportunity for effects bargaining. (p. 49.) more or view all topics or full text. |
43 | 100 | 12/19/18 |
| 2680M |
County of Santa Clara
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
While the employer was entitled to unilaterally decide to staff a particular shift with a non-bargaining unit peace officer rather than a bargaining unit employee, it was required to provide the union with notice and an opportunity to bargain the reasonably foreseeable effects of its decision before it implemented the change. (p. 13.) more or view all topics or full text. |
44 | 86 | 10/31/19 |
| 2680M |
County of Santa Clara
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
A failure or refusal to bargain over effects of a non-negotiable change is no less harmful than a failure to bargain over a negotiable change. In either case, the violation “disrupts and destabilizes employer-employee relations and is inconsistent with the goals of our statutes to improve both employer-employee relations and communications between public employers and their employees.” [Citation] (pp. 12-13.) more or view all topics or full text. |
44 | 86 | 10/31/19 |
| 2701I |
Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even if an employer’s decision is nonnegotiable, it must meet and confer over any foreseeable effects the decision may have on matters within the scope of representation. Once the employer makes a firm decision, it must provide the exclusive representative notice and a reasonable opportunity to negotiate prior to taking action that affects matters within the scope of representation. Upon receiving notice of the proposed change, the exclusive representative must make a valid request to bargain any foreseeable effects of the change on negotiable matters. Generally, an employer may not implement the nonnegotiable decision until the parties have reached agreement or impasse over the negotiable effects of the decision. (p. 47.) more or view all topics or full text. |
44 | 150 | 03/16/20 |
| 2701I |
Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
Even when an employer has no obligation to bargain over a particular decision, it must meet and confer over any foreseeable effects of the decision on matters within the scope of representation. (p. 32.) more or view all topics or full text. |
44 | 150 | 03/16/20 |
| 2694M |
City of Glendale
602.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Duty to Bargain Effects
City violated its obligation to bargain over the effects of its decision to subcontract and transfer bargaining unit work. PERB has long held that the MMBA’s duty to bargain extends to the implementation and effects of a decision that has a foreseeable effect on matters within the scope of representation, even where the decision itself is not negotiable. In both contexts—a decision involving a negotiable subject or a negotiable effect of a non-negotiable decision—the employer’s obligations are the same. Thus, an employer must provide timely notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the reasonably foreseeable effects of its decision before implementation, just as it would be required to do with a mandatory subject of bargaining. more or view all topics or full text. |
44 | 135 | 02/03/20 |