Decision 2544E – Bellflower Unified School District

LA-CE-5955-E

Decision Date: December 15, 2017

Decision Type: PERB Decision

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Perc Vol: 42
Perc Index: 70

Decision Headnotes

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.01000 – In General

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.06000 – Management-Rights Clause; Management Prerogative

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.07000 – Waiver by Union; Contract Waivers; Bargaining History Estoppel; Disclaimer; Supersession

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.03000 – Burden of Proof; Weight of Evidence; Presumptions and Inferences; Affirmative Defenses

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.10000 – Parole Evidence/Bargaining History

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.14000 – Witnesses: Credibility, Cross Examination and Impeachment; Pretrial Statements

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.01000 – Exceptions; Responses to Exceptions; Standing; Extensions of Time/Late Filing/Waiver

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.02000 – Weight Given to ALJ’s Proposed Decision: Findings, Conclusions, Credibility Resolutions

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.01000 – In General

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.02000 – Union’s Waiver of Employee or Organizational Rights

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.03000 – By Contract/Zipper Clauses/Management Rights Clauses

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.01000 – In General

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.02000 – Board’s Jurisdiction To Interpret Contracts

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.03000 – General Principles of Contract Interpretation

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.01000 – In General

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.02000 – Regulations Considered (By Number)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.03000 – Regulations Considered (By Number) (Continued)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.06000 – Management-Rights Clause; Management Prerogative

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.07000 – Waiver by Union; Contract Waivers; Bargaining History Estoppel; Disclaimer; Supersession

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.03000 – Burden of Proof; Weight of Evidence; Presumptions and Inferences; Affirmative Defenses

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.14000 – Witnesses: Credibility, Cross Examination and Impeachment; Pretrial Statements

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.01000 – Exceptions; Responses to Exceptions; Standing; Extensions of Time/Late Filing/Waiver

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.02000 – Weight Given to ALJ’s Proposed Decision: Findings, Conclusions, Credibility Resolutions

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.02000 – Union’s Waiver of Employee or Organizational Rights

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.03000 – By Contract/Zipper Clauses/Management Rights Clauses

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.02000 – Board’s Jurisdiction To Interpret Contracts

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.03000 – General Principles of Contract Interpretation

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.02000 – Regulations Considered (By Number)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.03000 – Regulations Considered (By Number) (Continued)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.01000 – In General

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.06000 – Management-Rights Clause; Management Prerogative

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.07000 – Waiver by Union; Contract Waivers; Bargaining History Estoppel; Disclaimer; Supersession

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.03000 – Burden of Proof; Weight of Evidence; Presumptions and Inferences; Affirmative Defenses

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.10000 – Parole Evidence/Bargaining History

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.14000 – Witnesses: Credibility, Cross Examination and Impeachment; Pretrial Statements

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.01000 – Exceptions; Responses to Exceptions; Standing; Extensions of Time/Late Filing/Waiver

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.02000 – Weight Given to ALJ’s Proposed Decision: Findings, Conclusions, Credibility Resolutions

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.05000 – Precedential Authority of PERB Decisions

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.01000 – In General

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.02000 – Union’s Waiver of Employee or Organizational Rights

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1402.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER
1402.03000 – By Contract/Zipper Clauses/Management Rights Clauses

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.01000 – In General

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.02000 – Board’s Jurisdiction To Interpret Contracts

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.03000 – General Principles of Contract Interpretation

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.01000 – In General

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.02000 – Regulations Considered (By Number)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.03000 – Regulations Considered (By Number) (Continued)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

102.00000 – PERB: OPERATION, JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY; SCOPE OF PERB JURISDICTION
102.03000 – Enforcement of Settlement Agreements and Contracts 3541.5(b); 3514.5(b); 3563.2(b)

Although the Board interpreted EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h), as making a collective bargaining agreement with a duration of more than three years contrary to public policy, it expressed no opinion whether such an agreement is void in its entirety, terminable at will by either party. (p. 8.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.01000 – In General

Although the Board interpreted EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h), as making a collective bargaining agreement with a duration of more than three years contrary to public policy, it expressed no opinion whether such an agreement is void in its entirety, terminable at will by either party. (p. 8.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.02000 – Board’s Jurisdiction To Interpret Contracts

Although the Board interpreted EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h), as making a collective bargaining agreement with a duration of more than three years contrary to public policy, it expressed no opinion whether such an agreement is void in its entirety, terminable at will by either party. (p. 8.)

1404.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION
1404.03000 – General Principles of Contract Interpretation

Although the Board interpreted EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h), as making a collective bargaining agreement with a duration of more than three years contrary to public policy, it expressed no opinion whether such an agreement is void in its entirety, terminable at will by either party. (p. 8.)

101.00000 – PERB: OPERATION, JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY; APPLICABILITY OF AND CONFLICTS WITH OTHER STATUTES
101.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

101.00000 – PERB: OPERATION, JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY; APPLICABILITY OF AND CONFLICTS WITH OTHER STATUTES
101.02000 – Conflicts Between PERB-Administered Laws and Other California Statutes; Education Code/Supersession; MMBA Supersession

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

102.00000 – PERB: OPERATION, JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY; SCOPE OF PERB JURISDICTION
102.03000 – Enforcement of Settlement Agreements and Contracts 3541.5(b); 3514.5(b); 3563.2(b)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.03000 – Business Necessity; Employer Financial Position

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.06000 – Management-Rights Clause; Management Prerogative

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

608.00000 – EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES
608.07000 – Waiver by Union; Contract Waivers; Bargaining History Estoppel; Disclaimer; Supersession

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.03000 – Burden of Proof; Weight of Evidence; Presumptions and Inferences; Affirmative Defenses

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1201.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; REINSTATEMENT; BACKPAY BENEFITS
1201.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1201.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; REINSTATEMENT; BACKPAY BENEFITS
1201.03000 – Back Pay; Interest

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1201.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; REINSTATEMENT; BACKPAY BENEFITS
1201.04000 – Restoration of Benefits

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1205.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; MISCELLANEOUS REMEDIAL PROVISIONS
1205.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1205.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; MISCELLANEOUS REMEDIAL PROVISIONS
1205.07000 – Restoration of Status Quo

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.01000 – In General

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.02000 – Regulations Considered (By Number)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1503.00000 – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; REGULATIONS
1503.03000 – Regulations Considered (By Number) (Continued)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.01000 – Exceptions; Responses to Exceptions; Standing; Extensions of Time/Late Filing/Waiver

Because the Board adopted the proposed decision, which fully considered and explained why certain information requested by the union was necessary and relevant, these same issues, presented to the Board as exceptions to the proposed decision, warranted no further discussion from the Board. Although the Board’s review of exceptions to a proposed decision is de novo, it need not address arguments that have already been adequately addressed in the same case or that would not affect the result. (p. 11.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.02000 – Weight Given to ALJ’s Proposed Decision: Findings, Conclusions, Credibility Resolutions

Because the Board adopted the proposed decision, which fully considered and explained why certain information requested by the union was necessary and relevant, these same issues, presented to the Board as exceptions to the proposed decision, warranted no further discussion from the Board. Although the Board’s review of exceptions to a proposed decision is de novo, it need not address arguments that have already been adequately addressed in the same case or that would not affect the result. (p. 11.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.06000 – De Novo Review; Standard of Review by Board

Because the Board adopted the proposed decision, which fully considered and explained why certain information requested by the union was necessary and relevant, these same issues, presented to the Board as exceptions to the proposed decision, warranted no further discussion from the Board. Although the Board’s review of exceptions to a proposed decision is de novo, it need not address arguments that have already been adequately addressed in the same case or that would not affect the result. (p. 11.)