Decision 2544E – Bellflower Unified School District

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

Because the uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of three union witnesses and one management witness was that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement had expired in 2010, the Board denied a school district’s exception arguing that the agreement’s management rights clause had remained in effect and served as a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over subcontracting of the district’s bus services. (p. 5.) Uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony at hearing is sufficient to carry the burden of proof in an unfair practice case. (PERB Reg. 32178.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that it had no notice that the ALJ considered the duration language of the parties’ agreement ambiguous or that the meaning of the duration language would be dispositive in the case by determining whether the management rights clause remained in effect. (p. 5-6.) A PERB hearing officer has the power and the duty to “[i]nquire fully into all issues and obtain a complete record upon which the decision can be rendered” and to “[r]ender and serve the proposed decision on each party.” (PERB Reg. 32170.) A hearing officer is not required to advise the parties of which factual disputes or legal issues may determine the outcome of the case, nor to make preliminary factual findings at the hearing itself so that the parties may object or offer additional evidence or argument on the issue. (Ibid.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

In the absence of any explanation or briefing from a school district who argued that the management rights clause remained in effect after 2010, or a request for reconsideration showing both extraordinary circumstances and that the Board’s determination in a prior decision that the parties’ agreement had expired in 2010 contained prejudicial error of fact, the Board had no grounds to consider the district’s waiver defense, which was based on the management rights language, in this case. (p. 7.) The interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is not simply a factual finding of the sort which the Board or its agents are free to disregard in a subsequent case involving the same language. Because of its significance for governing the parties’ ongoing relationship, a Board finding as to the meaning of a contract term is more akin to a question of law, particularly where, as here, the question is whether the contract itself is illegal or void for public policy, as declared by the three-year limit for collective bargaining agreements set forth in EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h). (pp. 6-7.)

Although the Board interpreted EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h), as making a collective bargaining agreement with a duration of more than three years contrary to public policy, it expressed no opinion whether such an agreement is void in its entirety, terminable at will by either party. (p. 8.)

Although the Board interpreted EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h), as making a collective bargaining agreement with a duration of more than three years contrary to public policy, it expressed no opinion whether such an agreement is void in its entirety, terminable at will by either party. (p. 8.)

Although the Board interpreted EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h), as making a collective bargaining agreement with a duration of more than three years contrary to public policy, it expressed no opinion whether such an agreement is void in its entirety, terminable at will by either party. (p. 8.)

Although the Board interpreted EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (h), as making a collective bargaining agreement with a duration of more than three years contrary to public policy, it expressed no opinion whether such an agreement is void in its entirety, terminable at will by either party. (p. 8.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

The Board rejected a school district’s exception that a Board-ordered remedy including restoration of the status quo and make-whole relief conflicted with federal law governing special education. The district’s statement of exceptions and supporting brief included no citation to any provision of the federal statute or decisional law interpreting it, and the district failed to explain how PERB’s customary remedy for a unilateral change would conflict with federal law. The district’s filing both failed to comply with the requirements of PERB Regulation 32300 governing exceptions, and, even if considered, had no merit. Unless a remedial measure positively conflicts with “inflexible standard[s]” or “immutable provisions” set by external law, the fact that it affects matters normally within the jurisdiction of another tribunal does not, by itself, make PERB’s remedy improper. (pp. 10-11.)

Because the Board adopted the proposed decision, which fully considered and explained why certain information requested by the union was necessary and relevant, these same issues, presented to the Board as exceptions to the proposed decision, warranted no further discussion from the Board. Although the Board’s review of exceptions to a proposed decision is de novo, it need not address arguments that have already been adequately addressed in the same case or that would not affect the result. (p. 11.)

Because the Board adopted the proposed decision, which fully considered and explained why certain information requested by the union was necessary and relevant, these same issues, presented to the Board as exceptions to the proposed decision, warranted no further discussion from the Board. Although the Board’s review of exceptions to a proposed decision is de novo, it need not address arguments that have already been adequately addressed in the same case or that would not affect the result. (p. 11.)

Because the Board adopted the proposed decision, which fully considered and explained why certain information requested by the union was necessary and relevant, these same issues, presented to the Board as exceptions to the proposed decision, warranted no further discussion from the Board. Although the Board’s review of exceptions to a proposed decision is de novo, it need not address arguments that have already been adequately addressed in the same case or that would not affect the result. (p. 11.)

A finding by the Board that an unfair labor practice was committed is presumptive proof that at least some backpay is owed. (Bellflower Unified School District (2019) PERB Order No. Ad-475, p. 10.) Notwithstanding this presumption, in compliance proceedings the charging party bears the burden of proving damages caused by the respondent’s unfair practices. (Regents of the University of California (2021) PERB Decision No. 2755-H, p. 56.) The charging party, however, need not prove damages with precision. Rather, make-whole relief usually involves predictions and estimates, and thus an approximation of actual damages may be sufficient to meet the charging party’s burden. (City of Pasadena (2014) PERB Order No. Ad-406-M, p. 14 (Pasadena).) PERB resolves uncertainties as to the amount owed against the wrongdoer. (Id. at p. 27; City of Culver City (2020) PERB Decision No. 2731-M, p. 26.) Moreover, provided that an estimate has a rational basis, and is not so excessive as to be punitive, it appropriately serves both a compensatory and deterrent function. (Pasadena, supra, PERB Order No. Ad-406-M, p. 13.)