Decision 2745M – County of Sacramento

Changes to job specifications, including training and certification requirements, are within the scope of representation unless the change is imposed by an outside agency or required to comply with an inflexible law or other immutable provision. (pp. 17-18.) Exception did not apply when State law set specific requirements for certain emergency personnel but did not discuss dispatchers at issue. (pp. 18-19.) Exception did not apply where a local agency, although granted authority to establish the policies and procedures at issue, was not an outside agency but a department of the same agency. (pp. 19-20.)

Changes to job specifications, including training and certification requirements, are within the scope of representation unless the change is imposed by an outside agency or required to comply with an inflexible law or other immutable provision. (pp. 17-18.) Exception did not apply when State law set specific requirements for certain emergency personnel but did not discuss dispatchers at issue. (pp. 18-19.) Exception did not apply where a local agency, although granted authority to establish the policies and procedures at issue, was not an outside agency but a department of the same agency. (pp. 19-20.)

Changes to job specifications, including training and certification requirements, are within the scope of representation unless the change is imposed by an outside agency or required to comply with an inflexible law or other immutable provision. (pp. 17-18.) Exception did not apply when State law set specific requirements for certain emergency personnel but did not discuss dispatchers at issue. (pp. 18-19.) Exception did not apply where a local agency, although granted authority to establish the policies and procedures at issue, was not an outside agency but a department of the same agency. (pp. 19-20.)

PERB uses “totality of the conduct” and “totality of the circumstances” interchangeably to describe the standard for assessing bad faith bargaining conduct that is not per se unlawful—conduct PERB frequently characterizes as “surface bargaining.” (p. 9, fn. 8.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)

PERB uses “totality of the conduct” and “totality of the circumstances” interchangeably to describe the standard for assessing bad faith bargaining conduct that is not per se unlawful—conduct PERB frequently characterizes as “surface bargaining.” (p. 9, fn. 8.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)

Bargaining in good faith requires a genuine desire to reach an agreement, and the Board thus looks to the entire course of negotiations, at and away from the table, to determine whether the respondent bargained with the requisite intent to reconcile differences and reach agreement. The ultimate inquiry is whether the totality of a respondent’s conduct was sufficiently egregious to frustrate negotiations or avoid agreement. (p. 23.)

The totality of the County’s conduct indicates it engaged in surface bargaining: (1) exhibited a take-it-or-leave-it attitude when claiming a new certification requirement was not negotiable even though it was not an immutable standard; (2) refused to bargain with the union over subjects within the scope of representation (e.g., wage increases tied to certification changes) or present counterproposals; and (3) terminated negotiations after two bargaining sessions without explanation in favor of unilaterally implementing the requirement before reaching a bona fide impasse. (pp. 24-26.)

The totality of the County’s conduct indicates it engaged in surface bargaining: (1) exhibited a take-it-or-leave-it attitude when claiming a new certification requirement was not negotiable even though it was not an immutable standard; (2) refused to bargain with the union over subjects within the scope of representation (e.g., wage increases tied to certification changes) or present counterproposals; and (3) terminated negotiations after two bargaining sessions without explanation in favor of unilaterally implementing the requirement before reaching a bona fide impasse. (pp. 24-26.)

The totality of the County’s conduct indicates it engaged in surface bargaining: (1) exhibited a take-it-or-leave-it attitude when claiming a new certification requirement was not negotiable even though it was not an immutable standard; (2) refused to bargain with the union over subjects within the scope of representation (e.g., wage increases tied to certification changes) or present counterproposals; and (3) terminated negotiations after two bargaining sessions without explanation in favor of unilaterally implementing the requirement before reaching a bona fide impasse. (pp. 24-26.)

The totality of the County’s conduct indicates it engaged in surface bargaining: (1) exhibited a take-it-or-leave-it attitude when claiming a new certification requirement was not negotiable even though it was not an immutable standard; (2) refused to bargain with the union over subjects within the scope of representation (e.g., wage increases tied to certification changes) or present counterproposals; and (3) terminated negotiations after two bargaining sessions without explanation in favor of unilaterally implementing the requirement before reaching a bona fide impasse. (pp. 24-26.)

The totality of the County’s conduct indicates it engaged in surface bargaining: (1) exhibited a take-it-or-leave-it attitude when claiming a new certification requirement was not negotiable even though it was not an immutable standard; (2) refused to bargain with the union over subjects within the scope of representation (e.g., wage increases tied to certification changes) or present counterproposals; and (3) terminated negotiations after two bargaining sessions without explanation in favor of unilaterally implementing the requirement before reaching a bona fide impasse. (pp. 24-26.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)

The totality of the County’s conduct indicates it engaged in surface bargaining: (1) exhibited a take-it-or-leave-it attitude when claiming a new certification requirement was not negotiable even though it was not an immutable standard; (2) refused to bargain with the union over subjects within the scope of representation (e.g., wage increases tied to certification changes) or present counterproposals; and (3) terminated negotiations after two bargaining sessions without explanation in favor of unilaterally implementing the requirement before reaching a bona fide impasse. (pp. 24-26.)

The totality of the County’s conduct indicates it engaged in surface bargaining: (1) exhibited a take-it-or-leave-it attitude when claiming a new certification requirement was not negotiable even though it was not an immutable standard; (2) refused to bargain with the union over subjects within the scope of representation (e.g., wage increases tied to certification changes) or present counterproposals; and (3) terminated negotiations after two bargaining sessions without explanation in favor of unilaterally implementing the requirement before reaching a bona fide impasse. (pp. 24-26.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)

Changes to job specifications, including training and certification requirements, are within the scope of representation unless the change is imposed by an outside agency or required to comply with an inflexible law or other immutable provision. (pp. 17-18.) Exception did not apply when State law set specific requirements for certain emergency personnel but did not discuss dispatchers at issue. (pp. 18-19.) Exception did not apply where a local agency, although granted authority to establish the policies and procedures at issue, was not an outside agency but a department of the same agency. (pp. 19-20.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)

Changes to job specifications, including training and certification requirements, are within the scope of representation. (p. 17.)

Changes to job specifications, including training and certification requirements, are within the scope of representation. (p. 17.)

Wages are within the scope of representation. (p. 20.)

Changes to job specifications, including training and certification requirements, are within the scope of representation. (p. 17.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

A complaint alleging surface bargaining typically states that, by the totality of its conduct, including but not limited to the conduct described in the complaint, the respondent failed and refused to meet and confer in good faith. In contrast, a complaint alleging a unilateral change—a per se violation—typically states that the respondent changed policy without affording the exclusive representative prior notice or an opportunity to meet and confer over the change or its effects. (p. 12.)

A proposed decision must address the allegations included in the complaint or justify why those allegations need not be addressed. (p. 16.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

A complaint alleging surface bargaining typically states that, by the totality of its conduct, including but not limited to the conduct described in the complaint, the respondent failed and refused to meet and confer in good faith. In contrast, a complaint alleging a unilateral change—a per se violation—typically states that the respondent changed policy without affording the exclusive representative prior notice or an opportunity to meet and confer over the change or its effects. (p. 12.)

A proposed decision must address the allegations included in the complaint or justify why those allegations need not be addressed. (p. 16.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

A proposed decision must address the allegations included in the complaint or justify why those allegations need not be addressed. (p. 16.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

PERB uses a “per se” or “totality of conduct” test to determine whether a respondent violated its obligation to meet and confer in good faith. Although the same conduct may give rise to violations under both per se and surface bargaining theories, they are necessarily different theories and must be alleged as separate unfair practices in the complaint. (pp. 11-12.) The omission of one theory does not foreclose its later consideration if the charging party: (1) moves to amend the complaint to add the independent allegation, or (2) satisfies the unalleged violation doctrine. (p. 13.)

PERB may consider an unalleged violation if: (1) the respondent has had adequate notice and opportunity to defend against the unalleged matter; (2) the unalleged conduct is intimately related to the subject matter of the complaint; (3) the matter has been fully litigated; (4) the parties have had the opportunity to examine and be cross-examined on the issue; and (5) the unalleged violation occurred within the same limitations period as those matters alleged in the complaint. (p. 14.)

The employer did not have sufficient notice to defend against an unalleged unilateral change theory because the union did not raise the theory during PERB’s investigatory or hearing process or in its post-hearing brief. On multiple occasions, the union referred only to allegations that the employer had engaged in surface bargaining. (pp. 15-16.)

When resolving exceptions to a proposed decision, the Board applies a de novo standard of review. Under this standard, the Board reviews the entire record and is free to make different factual findings and reach different legal conclusions than those in the proposed decision. (p. 10.)

When an employer has implemented terms and conditions of employment without reaching a bond fide impasse, PERB typically orders an employer to restore the status quo and rescind the implemented changes. However, where rescission may be contrary to the bargaining unit’s best interest or may disrupt the employer’s operations, it has allowed the charging party an opportunity to decline all or part of that relief and stayed rescission orders for a period of time to allow the parties an opportunity to bargain over alternative remedies. (pp. 27-28.)

When an employer has implemented terms and conditions of employment without reaching a bond fide impasse, PERB typically orders an employer to restore the status quo and rescind the implemented changes. However, where rescission may be contrary to the bargaining unit’s best interest or may disrupt the employer’s operations, it has allowed the charging party an opportunity to decline all or part of that relief and stayed rescission orders for a period of time to allow the parties an opportunity to bargain over alternative remedies. (pp. 27-28.)

When an employer has implemented terms and conditions of employment without reaching a bond fide impasse, PERB typically orders an employer to restore the status quo and rescind the implemented changes. However, where rescission may be contrary to the bargaining unit’s best interest or may disrupt the employer’s operations, it has allowed the charging party an opportunity to decline all or part of that relief and stayed rescission orders for a period of time to allow the parties an opportunity to bargain over alternative remedies. (pp. 27-28.)

When an employer has implemented terms and conditions of employment without reaching a bond fide impasse, PERB typically orders an employer to restore the status quo and rescind the implemented changes. However, where rescission may be contrary to the bargaining unit’s best interest or may disrupt the employer’s operations, it has allowed the charging party an opportunity to decline all or part of that relief and stayed rescission orders for a period of time to allow the parties an opportunity to bargain over alternative remedies. (pp. 27-28.)

When an employer has implemented terms and conditions of employment without reaching a bond fide impasse, PERB typically orders an employer to restore the status quo and rescind the implemented changes. However, where rescission may be contrary to the bargaining unit’s best interest or may disrupt the employer’s operations, it has allowed the charging party an opportunity to decline all or part of that relief and stayed rescission orders for a period of time to allow the parties an opportunity to bargain over alternative remedies. (pp. 27-28.)

When an employer has implemented terms and conditions of employment without reaching a bond fide impasse, PERB typically orders an employer to restore the status quo and rescind the implemented changes. However, where rescission may be contrary to the bargaining unit’s best interest or may disrupt the employer’s operations, it has allowed the charging party an opportunity to decline all or part of that relief and stayed rescission orders for a period of time to allow the parties an opportunity to bargain over alternative remedies. (pp. 27-28.)

When an employer has implemented terms and conditions of employment without reaching a bond fide impasse, PERB typically orders an employer to restore the status quo and rescind the implemented changes. However, where rescission may be contrary to the bargaining unit’s best interest or may disrupt the employer’s operations, it has allowed the charging party an opportunity to decline all or part of that relief and stayed rescission orders for a period of time to allow the parties an opportunity to bargain over alternative remedies. (pp. 27-28.)

Zipper clause generally permits both parties to refuse to bargain changes in matters covered by the terms of the clause during the life of their bargaining agreement. (p. 21.) But one cannot propose new terms and conditions of employment and simultaneously use the zipper clause as a shield to prevent the introduction of integrally related counterproposals, which amounts to unlawful piecemeal bargaining. (pp. 21-22.)