Decision 2867M – * * * JUDICIAL APPEAL PENDING * * * City and County of San Francisco

SF-CE-1663-M, SF-CE-1675-M, & SF-CE-1676-M

Decision Date: July 24, 2023

Decision Type: PERB Decision

Description:  In this consolidated case, Charging Parties International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21 and Service Employees International Union, Local 1021 (collectively, Charging Parties) challenged two San Francisco City Charter provisions that prohibit municipal workers from striking and that, among other things, mandate termination of striking employees. Charging Parties alleged that Respondents City and County of San Francisco and San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (collectively, the City or Respondents) maintained and enforced these provisions in violation of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA).

Specifically, Charter section A8.346 prohibits municipal employees from engaging in strikes, sets forth the procedures for terminating employees who the City find violated the section, and limits the seniority and compensation rights of such employees whom the City later rehires. This strike prohibition is reiterated in section A8.409-4, which states that any municipal employee who engages in a strike “shall be dismissed from his or her employment pursuant to Charter section A8.346.” Additionally, a Declaration of Policy at the outset of Charter section A8.409 declares that “strikes by city employees are not in the public interest.”

The underlying consolidated complaint, as amended, alleged that the Charter provisions conflict with the MMBA by constituting an absolute ban on strikes by employees, rendering the provisions unenforceable. The amended complaint further alleged that Respondents have required employees to sign a document acknowledging receipt of a form stating that any employee who participates in a strike shall be terminated, thereby interfering with employee rights and Charging Parties’ right to represent employees.

After a formal hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the challenged Charter provisions conflict with the MMBA to the extent they prohibit striking. As a remedy, the ALJ found Charter section A8.346 unenforceable in its entirety and severed the reference to that section’s strike prohibition from Charter section A8.409. The ALJ did not find that the City’s requiring employees to sign an acknowledgement and receipt of the Charter provisions constitutes direct dealing.

Disposition:  The Board affirmed the proposed decision’s finding that the Charter’s strike prohibition is unlawful facially and as applied. The Board further found unlawful the portion of the Declaration of Policy in A8.409 stating that City employee strikes are not in the public interest. The Board also affirmed the proposed decision’s remedial order deeming the unlawful Charter provisions void and unenforceable and ordered a City-wide notice posting. Last, the Board exercised its discretion not to reach Charging Parties’ exception regarding the dismissed direct dealing allegation as it would not impact the Board’s order even were it meritorious.

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Perc Vol: 48
Perc Index: 30

Decision Headnotes

301.00000 – UNFAIR PRACTICE ISSUES; STRIKES, SLOWDOWNS AND WORK STOPPAGES
301.01000 – In General

The limitations on California public sector employees’ right to strike are few and carefully defined. As the California Supreme Court explained, “strikes by public employees are not unlawful at common law unless or until it is clearly demonstrated that such a strike creates a substantial and imminent threat to the health or safety of the public.” (County Sanitation, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 586; see San Ramon Valley Unified School District (1984) PERB Order No. IR-46, p. 10 [a strike provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practices would be protected at any time during the bargaining process as long as the striking employee organization has not failed to participate in good faith in the statutory impasse procedure]; CCSF III, supra, PERB Decision No. 2536-M, p. 54 [“an economic strike occurring after exhaustion of statutory or other applicable impasse-resolution procedures” is “statutorily protected”].)
In addition to the County Sanitation standard, there are other instances where a strike can be found unlawful. For example, a strike occurring before the completion of statutory impasse procedures creates a rebuttable presumption that the strike violated the union’s duty to bargain and participate in the impasse procedures in good faith. (Fresno County IHSS, supra, PERB Decision No. 2418-M, p. 28; Sweetwater Union High School District (2014) PERB Order No. IR-58, pp. 9, 18 (Sweetwater).) The presumption may be overcome by the union’s showing that the strike was an “unfair practice strike.” (Rio Hondo Community College District (1983) PERB Decision No. 292, pp. 22-23 [union required to demonstrate that the employer committed an unfair practice and that misconduct provoked the strike].) A strike may also be unlawful if it is found to constitute “unlawful pressure tactics.” (See Regents of the University of California (2019) PERB Order No. IR-62-H, pp. 6-10.) (p. 26.)

301.00000 – UNFAIR PRACTICE ISSUES; STRIKES, SLOWDOWNS AND WORK STOPPAGES
301.01000 – In General

Strikes by public employees are statutorily protected, except as limited by other provisions of the MMBA or other public-sector labor relations statutes and controlling precedent. (p. 25)

403.00000 – EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE; RESTRAINT, COERCION; SURVEILLANCE
403.01000 – In General; Unlawful Surveillance

Charter subsections that require actual surveillance of employees engaging in strike activities and create the appearance of surveillance found unlawful. Surveillance of protected activity, or creating the appearance of surveillance, totally conflicts with the MMBA. (County of San Bernardino (2018) PERB Decision No. 2556-M, p. 20 [employer photographing or videotaping employees or openly engaging in recordkeeping of employees participating in union activities is unlawful surveillance because of the tendency to intimidate employees].) (pp. 31-32.)

403.00000 – EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE; RESTRAINT, COERCION; SURVEILLANCE
403.04000 – Statements to Employees, Creating Impression of Surveillance

Charter subsections that require actual surveillance of employees engaging in strike activities and create the appearance of surveillance found unlawful. Surveillance of protected activity, or creating the appearance of surveillance, totally conflicts with the MMBA. (County of San Bernardino (2018) PERB Decision No. 2556-M, p. 20 [employer photographing or videotaping employees or openly engaging in recordkeeping of employees participating in union activities is unlawful surveillance because of the tendency to intimidate employees].) (pp. 31-32.)

750.00000 – EMPLOYER ADOPTION/ENFORCEMENT OF UNREASONABLE RULE
750.01000 – In General

Under the MMBA, a local agency may adopt reasonable rules and regulations pertaining to resolving collective bargaining disputes. (MMBA, § 3507, subd. (a)(5).) In order to be lawful, such rules and regulations may not undercut or frustrate the MMBA’s policies and purposes. Therefore, if a local agency has adopted its rules, regulations, or charter provisions, whether by a vote of its electorate, a vote of its governing board, or by any other means, the resulting policies must be consistent with the MMBA. (p. 24.)

750.00000 – EMPLOYER ADOPTION/ENFORCEMENT OF UNREASONABLE RULE
750.01000 – In General

A facial challenge to a rule is based solely on the text of the rule. “There are at least two possible standards for evaluating a facial challenge. (Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1126.) Under the stricter standard, we should reject a facial challenge to a rule unless it totally and fatally conflicts with the MMBA. (Ibid.) Courts often follow a more lenient standard, however, wherein a facial challenge to a rule can be sustained if it conflicts with the MMBA “in the generality or great majority of cases.” (Ibid.) Under either test, a party alleging a facial violation cannot prevail merely by suggesting that the challenged rule may run afoul of the law in “some future hypothetical situation.” (Beach & Bluff Conservancy v. City of Solana Beach (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 244, 264.) (pp. 27-28.)

750.00000 – EMPLOYER ADOPTION/ENFORCEMENT OF UNREASONABLE RULE
750.01000 – In General

Charter section dedicated to prohibiting employee strikes, mandating City management surveil employees during a strike and terminate any employee found to have engaged in strike activity found unlawful. Its across-the-board approach to prohibiting all employee strikes is contrary to PERB’s narrow, restrained methodology for determining the lawfulness of a strike, as dictated by County Sanitation, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 586. (County of San Mateo, supra, PERB Order No. IR 61-M, pp. 6-8.)

1105.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE
1105.03000 – Burden of Proof; Weight of Evidence; Presumptions and Inferences; Affirmative Defenses

When a local rule is challenged as unlawful, we start from a position of presuming that an employer’s rule is reasonable and lawful, which means that the burden of proof is on the party challenging such a rule. (pp. 24-25.)

1107.00000 – CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD
1107.20000 – Other

The Board may exercise its discretion not to resolve that claim because the remedial order already requires the City cease and desist distributing the Charter acknowledgement forms. (The Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Decision No. 2855, p. 3 [exercising discretion not to resolve or remand a claim that would not materially alter the remedy if proven], citing City of Bellflower (2021) PERB Decision No. 2770-M, p. 10; see also County of San Joaquin (2021) PERB Decision No. 2761-M, p. 83; City of Glendale (2020) PERB Decision No. 2694-M, pp. 58-59.) (p. 42.)

1202.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; FACTORS LIMITING OR TERMINATING LIABILITY
1202.02000 – Agreement Between. the Parties

Respondents request the parties be provided a reasonable period of time to negotiate a remedy that effectuates the purposes of the MMBA, which is opposed by Charging Parties. The Board has a longstanding policy favoring voluntary settlement of disputes. (Dry Creek Joint Elementary School District (1980) PERB Order No. Ad-81a.) Because the unlawful provisions affect City employees beyond the Charging Parties’ bargaining units, the number of interested parties makes a potential alternative resolution ill-suited for negotiation by only two of the many unions representing City employees. We do not find it appropriate to provide the parties with additional time to negotiate, but to the extent the parties are now able to reach mutually agreeable terms that substantially comply with the Board’s remedial order, they may present the settlement agreement to the OGC, to be considered during compliance. (p. 56.)

1205.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; MISCELLANEOUS REMEDIAL PROVISIONS
1205.01000 – In General

Because PERB is a quasi-judicial agency, the separation of powers doctrine prevents PERB from compelling legislative action by a city or county. (City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1310 (Palo Alto).) Therefore, PERB lacks the authority to order the City to rescind charter provisions. However, it is “appropriate and within PERB’s authority to declare void and unenforceable portions of the Charter that conflict with the MMBA. Unlike ordering the language ‘rescinded,’ such an order does not amount to ‘rewriting’ the Charter, but merely enjoins enforcement of the illegal regulation.” (CCSF III, supra, PERB Decision No. 2536-M, p. 39.) (pp. 53-54.)

1205.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; MISCELLANEOUS REMEDIAL PROVISIONS
1205.01000 – In General

An action in quo warranto is the exclusive means to invalidate a ballot initiative that was passed in violation of the MMBA’s meet-and-confer requirement. (See Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 376, 384-386.) But when the order does not remedy a procedural irregularity in the legislative process that resulted in the enactment of any portions of the City Charter, quo warranto would not be available to remedy the violations alleged in this case. Where a local ordinance conflicts with the MMBA, it is void or invalid. (See LA County, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at p. 908; see also Huntington Beach Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Huntington Beach, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 503.)

1205.00000 – REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES; MISCELLANEOUS REMEDIAL PROVISIONS
1205.03000 – Notices; Posting, Reading, and Mailing

When void and unenforceable Charter provisions impacted City employees beyond the bargaining units represented by Charging Parties, Board ordered the notice to be posted City-wide.

1401.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; LACHES
1401.01000 – In General

“The party asserting and seeking to benefit from the laches bar bears the burden of proof on these factors.” (Mt. San Antonio Community College Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 178, 188.) In unfair practice proceedings, laches requires a respondent to show: (1) the charging party has unreasonably delayed in prosecuting its case, and (2) either the charging party has acquiesced in the acts about which it complains, or the respondent has suffered prejudice as a result of the charging party’s unreasonable delay. (Santa Ana Unified School District (2017) PERB Decision No. 2514, p. 22, citing Mt. San Antonio Community College Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 188; Vernon Fire Fighters Assn. v. City of Vernon (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 710, 719; Santa Monica Mun. Employees Assn. v. City of Santa Monica (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1538, 1546-1547.) (pp. 51-52.)

1405.00000 – GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; RES JUDICATA
1405.01000 – In General

Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue already decided in another proceeding where: “(1) the issue is identical to that decided in the former proceeding, (2) the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding, (3) the issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding, (4) the decision in the former proceeding is final and on the merits, and (5) preclusion is sought against a person who was a party or in privity with a party to the former proceeding.” (Castillo v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 477, 481; see also City and County of San Francisco (2022) PERB Order No. Ad-497-M, p. 27.)