

STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
DECISION OF THE  
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD



GARY CIAFFONI, EDYTH R. THOMPSON, )  
DAISEY E. BAILEY, NICKI L. HILL, )  
CLARA WILLIAMS, NEVILLE J. MAISH, )  
MERRYANNE L. ROBINSON, GLENDA J. )  
LOVEJOY, JOHNNY C. THIBODEAU, )  
JOHN V. THIBODEAU, KATHY L. THIBODEAU, )  
RICHARD C. LANG, DALE F. HEMSTREET, )  
 )  
Charging Parties, ) Case No. S-CO-100  
 )  
v. ) PERB Decision No. 427  
 )  
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES ) November 6, 1984  
ASSOCIATION, )  
 )  
Respondent. )  
 )  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

Appearances: Allen Law Corporation by Lawrence J. Friedman,  
for Gary Ciaffoni, et al.; Peter A. Janiak, Attorney for  
California School Employees Association.

Before Hesse, Chairperson; Tovar and Burt, Members.

DECISION AND ORDER

HESSE, Chairperson: The charging parties appeal the regional attorney's dismissal of their unfair practice charge filed on June 28, 1983, against the California School Employees Association. As the perfunctory letter of appeal advances no errors of law or fact, nor presents any newly discovered evidence, the Public Employment Relations Board has no alternative but to summarily affirm the dismissal by the regional attorney and adopt it as the Decision of the Board itself. Accordingly, Charge No. S-CO-100 is DISMISSED in its entirety without leave to amend.

Members Tovar and Burt joined in this Decision.



## PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

Sacramento Regional Office  
1031 18th Street, Suite 102  
Sacramento, California 95814  
(916) 322-3198



August 31, 1983

Robin W. Allen, Esq.  
Allen Law Corporation  
Powell Teichert Center  
3620 American River Drive, Suite 224  
Sacramento, CA 95825

Re: Ciaffoni et. al. v. California School Employees Association  
Charge No. S-CO-100

Dear Mr. Allen:

I indicated to you in my letter dated August 23, 1983 that the above-referenced charge did not state a prima facie case, and that unless you amended the charge to state a prima facie case or withdrew it prior to August 30, 1983, it would be dismissed. More specifically I informed you that if there were any facts which would correct the deficiencies explained in that letter, to please amend the charge accordingly.

I have not received either a request for withdrawal or an amended charge from you and am therefore dismissing this charge based on the facts and reasons stated in my August 23, 1983 letter and repeated below.

The above-referenced charge alleges that the California School Employees Association (Association) entered into a settlement with the Nevada Joint Union High School District (District) of an unfair practice charge which failed to adequately compensate the charging parties for their lost wages, fringe benefits, and seniority. This conduct is alleged to violate sections 3544.9 and 3543.6(b) of the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA).

My investigation revealed the following: On November 9, 1981 the California School Employees Association and its Western Nevada Chapter #435 filed an unfair practice charge against the District and five other school districts alleging unilateral termination of all bargaining unit employees and contracting out of unit work (charge No. S-CE-451). The bargaining unit consisted primarily of transportation employees.

During 1982 the legal staff of the Association pursued a settlement of this unfair with the District and participated in

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discussions on the settlement with the former transportation department employees of the District including the charging parties in the instant case. On July 22, 1982, a meeting took place between these previous employees of the District (including the charging parties here) and Sierra Windsor and Peter Janiak of the Association's legal staff to enable CSEA to explain the proposed settlement of Case No. S-02-451. The former employees present voted seven to five to accept the proposed settlement of \$22,000 in cash, to be divided into equal shares.

There is a factual dispute over Windsor's explanation of who would be eligible to collect a share of the settlement. Windsor claims that it was made clear to the people at the meeting that all former employees of the District who had applied for employment with the contractor, Russell Transportation, and been rejected would have a share of the settlement money. A former employee present at the meeting, however, said that only those present at the meeting would receive a share of the settlement proceeds.

Within a matter of weeks the controversy over who would share in the settlement caused a series of letters and phone calls to be exchanged between Clara Williams, former chapter president of the Association's local chapter, and Windsor. In addition, the former employees conducted another meeting without a representative of CSEA where another vote was taken which rejected the settlement offer. Windsor signed the settlement agreement on behalf of the Association and its local chapter on September 30, 1982.

On February 7, 1983 the charging parties filed a complaint for damages, breach of collective bargaining agreement, and breach of duty of fair representation in Nevada County Superior Court. On June 3, 1982, Judge Francis of the Superior Court sustained the demurrers of Defendants District and Association because the "dispute as set forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint is, at the minimum, an arguable unfair labor practice with exclusive jurisdiction in the Public Employees' Relations Board (sic)." The instant charge was filed on June 28, 1983.

Based on the facts stated above, this charge does not state a prima facie violation of section 3544.9 or 3543.6(b) of EERA for the reasons explained below.

Government Code section 3544.9 states "The employee organization recognized or certified as the exclusive representative for the purpose of meeting and negotiating shall fairly represent each and every employee in the appropriate unit." To make out a prima facie violation of this section, the charging party must set forth a clear and concise statement of acts demonstrating that the employee association acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in bad faith. King v. Fremont Unified School District Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (4/21/80) PERB Decision No. 125; Board Rule 32615(a)(5).

The charge alleges that the Association failed to compensate the charging parties adequately, thereby violating its duty of fair representation. The investigation indicated, however, that the charging parties argue that the Association violated its duty of fair representation for two reasons: (a) by failing to indicate clearly that the settlement proceeds would be distributed to all alleged discriminatees rather than only those who attended the meeting, and/or (b) by settling the case for too little money.

(a) There have been no facts presented nor discovered during the investigation that demonstrate that the Association's alleged failure to accurately outline how the proceeds would be divided violated its duty of fair representation. Even assuming that the allegations of the charge concerning this incident are true, the Association's conduct does not involve more than negligence on the part of the CSEA legal staff for failure to clearly outline how the settlement would be distributed. PERB has held that mere negligence is insufficient to state a prima facie violation of section 3544.9 of the EERA. Collins v. United Teachers of Los Angeles (11/17/82) PERB Decision No. 258.

(b) The allegation that CSEA settled the case for too little money similarly does not state a prima facie case. The Association's acceptance of a \$22,000 settlement, without more, cannot be construed as a violation of the duty, for it is not enough to establish bad faith, arbitrary or discriminatory conduct. Charging parties were ready to accept the \$22,000 settlement and then changed their minds when it became clear that they might have to lessen their "cut" by including others in the settlement. The complained-of conduct demonstrated here does not rise to a breach of the duty of fair representation.

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Charging parties have also alleged a violation of 3543.6(b) of the EERA. In Kimmett v. Service Employees' International Union (10/19/79) PERB Decision No. 106, the Board held that violation of section 3544.9 is an unfair practice under section 3543.6(b), and that conduct proscribed by section 3543.6(b) encompasses more than just the breach of duty of fair representation. To demonstrate such a violation of 3543.6(b), the conduct alleged to constitute an unfair practice must tend to or actually result in some harm to employees rights guaranteed under the EERA. Kimmett v. Service Employees' International Union, supra. No evidence has been presented here which shows that the charging parties rights under the EERA were abused by the Association's actions. Accordingly, no prima facie violation of section 3543.6(b) has been made out.

Pursuant to Public Employment Relations Board regulation section 32635 (California Administrative Code, title 8, part III), you may appeal the refusal to issue a complaint (dismissal) to the Board itself.

#### Right to Appeal

You may obtain a review of this dismissal of the charge by filing an appeal to the Board itself within twenty (20) calendar days after service of this dismissal (section 32635(a)). To be timely filed, the original and five (5) copies of such appeal must be actually received by the Board itself before the close of business (5:00 p.m.) on September 20, 1983, or sent by telegraph or certified United States mail postmarked not later than September 20, 1983 (section 32135). The Board's address is:

Public Employment Relations Board  
1031 18th Street  
Sacramento, CA 95814

If you file a timely appeal of the refusal to issue a complaint, any other party may file with the Board an original and five (5) copies of a statement in opposition within twenty (20) calendar days following the date of service of the appeal (section 32635(b)).

#### Service

All documents authorized to be filed herein must also be "served" upon all parties to the proceeding, and a "proof of

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service" must accompany the document filed with the Board itself (see section 32140 for the required contents and a sample form). The document will be considered properly "served" when personally delivered or deposited in the first-class mail postage paid and properly addressed.

#### Extension of Time

A request for an extension of time in which to file a document with the Board itself must be in writing and filed with the Board at the previously noted address. A request for an extension must be filed at least three (3) calendar days before the expiration of the time required for filing the document. The request must indicate good cause for and, if known, the position of each other party regarding the extension, and shall be accompanied by proof of service of the request upon each party (section 32132).

#### Final Date

If no appeal is filed within the specified time limits, the dismissal will become final when the time limits have expired.

Very truly yours,

DENNIS M. SULLIVAN  
General Counsel

By  
Robert Thompson  
Regional Attorney

