GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – General Principles

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It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that the term “or” has a disjunctive meaning. (Houge v. Ford (1955) 44 Cal.2d 706, 712 [285 P.2d 257] (Houge); see also, In re Jesusa (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 205].) “In its ordinary sense, the function of the word ‘or’ is to mark an alternative such as ‘either this or that.’” (Houge at p. 712.) It is also a well-settled rule of statutory construction that qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [183 Cal.Rptr. 520].) Thus, where there is a disjunctive “or” before a final clause with a qualifying phrase, the qualifying phrase should be interpreted as only applying to that final clause. (See, e.g., Furtado v. Sierra Community College (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 876, 881 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 5891; Fischer v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 87 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 452].) To extend the application of a qualifying phrase back past the disjunctive “or” would violate accepted rules of statutory construction. (Hopkins v. Anderson (1933) 218 Cal. 62, 65 [21 P.2d 560]; County of Los Angeles v. Graves (1930) 210 Cal. 21, 26 [290 P. 444].) (pp. 9-10.)