| Decision | Description | PERC Vol. | PERC Index | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
900.02000: IMPASSE PROCEDURES; IN GENERAL; DUTY TO PARTICIPATE IN GOOD FAITH; Declaration/Determination of Impasse
The Board rejected Charging Party’s exception that, by requesting bargaining over a single issue following impasse, the Charging Party had effectively broken the deadlock and revived the Respondent’s duty to bargain over the single issue, which had already been part of the overall deadlock reached in negotiations for a successor MOU. (pp. 10-11.) The Board found no violation of the duty to bargain because Charging Party’s request for single-issue negotiations did not break the impasse and revive the Respondent’s duty to bargain. Although impasse necessarily entails an overall deadlock in negotiations, it may stem from disagreement over a single subject, if the disagreement is of such importance that the parties’ failure to agree on that one subject causes all negotiations to break down. (pp. 10-11.) The party asserting that an impasse has been broken must point to the changed circumstances that would justify a return to the bargaining table. Mere speculation regarding possible concessions by the other party is insufficient to revive bargaining. There must be substantial evidence that a party is committed to a new bargaining position. Vague and general statements about possible concessions or a request by one party for additional meetings, if unaccompanied by an indication of the areas in which that party foresees future concessions, are insufficient to break an impasse where the other party has clearly announced that its position is final. (p. 9.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
1105.01000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE; In General
The Board rejected Charging Party’s exception that, by requesting bargaining over a single issue following impasse, the Charging Party had effectively broken the deadlock and revived the Respondent’s duty to bargain over the single issue, which had already been part of the overall deadlock reached in negotiations for a successor MOU. (pp. 10-11.) The Board found no violation of the duty to bargain because Charging Party’s request for single-issue negotiations did not break the impasse and revive the Respondent’s duty to bargain. Although impasse necessarily entails an overall deadlock in negotiations, it may stem from disagreement over a single subject, if the disagreement is of such importance that the parties’ failure to agree on that one subject causes all negotiations to break down. (pp. 10-11.) The party asserting that an impasse has been broken must point to the changed circumstances that would justify a return to the bargaining table. Mere speculation regarding possible concessions by the other party is insufficient to revive bargaining. There must be substantial evidence that a party is committed to a new bargaining position. Vague and general statements about possible concessions or a request by one party for additional meetings, if unaccompanied by an indication of the areas in which that party foresees future concessions, are insufficient to break an impasse where the other party has clearly announced that its position is final. (p. 9.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
1105.03000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; EVIDENCE; Burden of Proof; Weight of Evidence; Presumptions and Inferences; Affirmative Defenses
The Board rejected Charging Party’s exception that, by requesting bargaining over a single issue following impasse, the Charging Party had effectively broken the deadlock and revived the Respondent’s duty to bargain over the single issue, which had already been part of the overall deadlock reached in negotiations for a successor MOU. (pp. 10-11.) The Board found no violation of the duty to bargain because Charging Party’s request for single-issue negotiations did not break the impasse and revive the Respondent’s duty to bargain. Although impasse necessarily entails an overall deadlock in negotiations, it may stem from disagreement over a single subject, if the disagreement is of such importance that the parties’ failure to agree on that one subject causes all negotiations to break down. (pp. 10-11.) The party asserting that an impasse has been broken must point to the changed circumstances that would justify a return to the bargaining table. Mere speculation regarding possible concessions by the other party is insufficient to revive bargaining. There must be substantial evidence that a party is committed to a new bargaining position. Vague and general statements about possible concessions or a request by one party for additional meetings, if unaccompanied by an indication of the areas in which that party foresees future concessions, are insufficient to break an impasse where the other party has clearly announced that its position is final. (p. 9.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
1107.01000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD; Exceptions; Responses to Exceptions; Standing; Extensions of Time/Late Filing/Waiver
The Board rejected Charging Party’s exception that, by requesting bargaining over a single issue following impasse, the Charging Party had effectively broken the deadlock and revived the Respondent’s duty to bargain over the single issue, which had already been part of the overall deadlock reached in negotiations for a successor MOU. (pp. 10-11.) The Board found no violation of the duty to bargain because Charging Party’s request for single-issue negotiations did not break the impasse and revive the Respondent’s duty to bargain. Although impasse necessarily entails an overall deadlock in negotiations, it may stem from disagreement over a single subject, if the disagreement is of such importance that the parties’ failure to agree on that one subject causes all negotiations to break down. (pp. 10-11.) The party asserting that an impasse has been broken must point to the changed circumstances that would justify a return to the bargaining table. Mere speculation regarding possible concessions by the other party is insufficient to revive bargaining. There must be substantial evidence that a party is committed to a new bargaining position. Vague and general statements about possible concessions or a request by one party for additional meetings, if unaccompanied by an indication of the areas in which that party foresees future concessions, are insufficient to break an impasse where the other party has clearly announced that its position is final. (p. 9.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
1107.02000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD; Weight Given to ALJ's Proposed Decision: Findings, Conclusions, Credibility Resolutions
The Board rejected Charging Party’s exception that, by requesting bargaining over a single issue following impasse, the Charging Party had effectively broken the deadlock and revived the Respondent’s duty to bargain over the single issue, which had already been part of the overall deadlock reached in negotiations for a successor MOU. (pp. 10-11.) The Board found no violation of the duty to bargain because Charging Party’s request for single-issue negotiations did not break the impasse and revive the Respondent’s duty to bargain. Although impasse necessarily entails an overall deadlock in negotiations, it may stem from disagreement over a single subject, if the disagreement is of such importance that the parties’ failure to agree on that one subject causes all negotiations to break down. (pp. 10-11.) The party asserting that an impasse has been broken must point to the changed circumstances that would justify a return to the bargaining table. Mere speculation regarding possible concessions by the other party is insufficient to revive bargaining. There must be substantial evidence that a party is committed to a new bargaining position. Vague and general statements about possible concessions or a request by one party for additional meetings, if unaccompanied by an indication of the areas in which that party foresees future concessions, are insufficient to break an impasse where the other party has clearly announced that its position is final. (p. 9.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
605.01000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; OTHER PER SE VIOLATIONS; Outright Refusal to Bargain
Applying precedents decided under other PERB-administered statutes, the Board held that a the Trial Court Act employer need not make a second formal declaration of impasse or re-invoke the impasse resolution procedures contained in its local rules when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. PERB cases decided under EERA and the Dills Act hold that “once the statute’s impasse procedures have been concluded, PERB has no authority to recertify impasse or [to] reinvoke impasse procedures,” which have already failed to resolve the dispute. (p. 11.) Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to make another formal declaration of impasse or invoke the impasse resolution procedures in the EERR when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
608.01000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES; In General
Applying precedents decided under other PERB-administered statutes, the Board held that a the Trial Court Act employer need not make a second formal declaration of impasse or re-invoke the impasse resolution procedures contained in its local rules when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. PERB cases decided under EERA and the Dills Act hold that “once the statute’s impasse procedures have been concluded, PERB has no authority to recertify impasse or [to] reinvoke impasse procedures,” which have already failed to resolve the dispute. (p. 11.) Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to make another formal declaration of impasse or invoke the impasse resolution procedures in the EERR when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
608.08000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES; Exhaustion of Impasse Procedures or Time Between Impasse and Mediation
Applying precedents decided under other PERB-administered statutes, the Board held that a the Trial Court Act employer need not make a second formal declaration of impasse or re-invoke the impasse resolution procedures contained in its local rules when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. PERB cases decided under EERA and the Dills Act hold that “once the statute’s impasse procedures have been concluded, PERB has no authority to recertify impasse or [to] reinvoke impasse procedures,” which have already failed to resolve the dispute. (p. 11.) Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to make another formal declaration of impasse or invoke the impasse resolution procedures in the EERR when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
900.01000: IMPASSE PROCEDURES; IN GENERAL; DUTY TO PARTICIPATE IN GOOD FAITH; In General
Applying precedents decided under other PERB-administered statutes, the Board held that a the Trial Court Act employer need not make a second formal declaration of impasse or re-invoke the impasse resolution procedures contained in its local rules when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. PERB cases decided under EERA and the Dills Act hold that “once the statute’s impasse procedures have been concluded, PERB has no authority to recertify impasse or [to] reinvoke impasse procedures,” which have already failed to resolve the dispute. (p. 11.) Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to make another formal declaration of impasse or invoke the impasse resolution procedures in the EERR when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
900.02000: IMPASSE PROCEDURES; IN GENERAL; DUTY TO PARTICIPATE IN GOOD FAITH; Declaration/Determination of Impasse
Applying precedents decided under other PERB-administered statutes, the Board held that a the Trial Court Act employer need not make a second formal declaration of impasse or re-invoke the impasse resolution procedures contained in its local rules when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. PERB cases decided under EERA and the Dills Act hold that “once the statute’s impasse procedures have been concluded, PERB has no authority to recertify impasse or [to] reinvoke impasse procedures,” which have already failed to resolve the dispute. (p. 11.) Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to make another formal declaration of impasse or invoke the impasse resolution procedures in the EERR when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| 2523C |
El Dorado County Superior Court
900.04000: IMPASSE PROCEDURES; IN GENERAL; DUTY TO PARTICIPATE IN GOOD FAITH; During Impasse
Applying precedents decided under other PERB-administered statutes, the Board held that a the Trial Court Act employer need not make a second formal declaration of impasse or re-invoke the impasse resolution procedures contained in its local rules when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. PERB cases decided under EERA and the Dills Act hold that “once the statute’s impasse procedures have been concluded, PERB has no authority to recertify impasse or [to] reinvoke impasse procedures,” which have already failed to resolve the dispute. (p. 11.) Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court to make another formal declaration of impasse or invoke the impasse resolution procedures in the EERR when those same procedures had already been exhausted without resolving the same dispute over a successor MOU. more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 152 | 03/20/17 |
| J027E |
California Virtual Academies
1303.09000: REPRESENTATION ISSUES; ELECTIONS; Stay of
(Representation matters generally should not be subject to unwarranted delay through pursuit of judicial review. If an election is not to be stayed pending judicial review, a fortiori, a unit determination and certification of exclusive representative is not to be stayed pending a party’s pursuit of judicial review.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 74 | 09/30/16 |
| J027E |
California Virtual Academies
1311.01000: REPRESENTATION ISSUES; JUDICIAL REVIEW, REPRESENTATION, DECISIONS; In General
(The Board applies a strict standard when reviewing requests for judicial review, and will join in a request only in cases of special importance. The Board has held that: A case has “special importance” if the Board determines that (1) there is a novel issue presented; (2) the issue primarily involves construction of a statutory provision unique to EERA; and (3) the issue is likely to arise frequently. PERB joins in requests for judicial review only in the narrowest of circumstances. The three-part test for determining “special importance” is phrased in the conjunctive, and therefore all three parts must be satisfied before PERB will join in the request for judicial review. If the first two prongs of the Board’s three part test for seeking judicial review are not met, it is not relevant whether the issues presented in this case are likely to arise frequently.) (While PERB has not previously concluded that multiple public agencies have comprised a single employer, the Board has considered the “single employer” doctrine under EERA on prior occasions and determined under the facts of those cases that the “single employer” theory did not apply. The Board’s analysis of the doctrine clearly indicates that the “single employer” concept is not novel to the Board. There is nothing “unprecedented” about the Board’s finding that the 11 CAVA schools constitute a single employer.) (The Board’s conclusion that Education Code section 47611.5, subdivision (b) did not preclude a finding that a charter school with multiple sites was a single employer does not present a novel issue warranting judicial review. The fact that CAVA disagrees with the Board’s legal and factual conclusions does not make for a “novel” issue. If such disagreements did determine a “novel issue,” every case involving conflicting statutory interpretations, no matter their merit, would satisfy this element, rendering meaningless the policy considerations that counsel for a very strict standard in joining in requests for judicial review.) (The decision’s discussion of the meaning of the phrase “exclusive public school employer” contained in Education Code section 47611.5, subdivision (b). in addressing CAVA’s argument does not turn this fact-intensive case into one of statutory construction.) (Simply because CAVA asserts that charter schools are likely to proliferate does not demonstrate that the particular issues in this case are likely to arise frequently, especially given the fact-intensive nature of the decision.) (When the requestor’s arguments address “issues of fact and factual interpretation” upon which the underlying PERB decision is based, “[t]hey do not meet the standard necessary to justify approval of the request for judicial review.) (Representation matters generally should not be subject to unwarranted delay through pursuit of judicial review. If an election is not to be stayed pending judicial review, a fortiori, a unit determination and certification of exclusive representative is not to be stayed pending a party’s pursuit of judicial review.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 74 | 09/30/16 |
| J027E |
California Virtual Academies
1500.02000: MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES; EDUCATION CODE; Education Code Sections Considered by PERB (By Number)
(The Board’s conclusion that Education Code section 47611.5, subdivision (b) did not preclude a finding that a charter school with multiple sites was a single employer does not present a novel issue warranting judicial review. The fact that CAVA disagrees with the Board’s legal and factual conclusions does not make for a “novel” issue. If such disagreements did determine a “novel issue,” every case involving conflicting statutory interpretations, no matter their merit, would satisfy this element, rendering meaningless the policy considerations that counsel for a very strict standard in joining in requests for judicial review.) (The decision’s discussion of the meaning of the phrase “exclusive public school employer” contained in Education Code section 47611.5, subdivision (b). in addressing CAVA’s argument does not turn this fact-intensive case into one of statutory construction.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 74 | 09/30/16 |
| A451E |
Berkeley Unified School District
1101.05000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; LIMITATION PERIOD FOR FILING CHARGE; Parties; Service
(The Board may excuse defective service if the opposing parties have received actual notice of the filing and there is no showing of prejudice.) (The representative identified on a notice of appearance form is regarded as the party’s designated representative for purposes of service.) more or view all topics or full text. |
42 | 31 | 08/16/17 |
| A451E |
Berkeley Unified School District
1103.06000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; COMPLAINT; Service
(The Board may excuse defective service if the opposing parties have received actual notice of the filing and there is no showing of prejudice.) (The representative identified on a notice of appearance form is regarded as the party’s designated representative for purposes of service.) more or view all topics or full text. |
42 | 31 | 08/16/17 |
| A451E |
Berkeley Unified School District
1107.01000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD; Exceptions; Responses to Exceptions; Standing; Extensions of Time/Late Filing/Waiver
(The Board may excuse late filings for good cause only, which requires an affirmative showing of good cause for the late filing and the absence of prejudice to the opposing party. The Board may excuse defective service, on the other hand, if the opposing parties have received actual notice of the filing and there is no showing of prejudice.) (Where an appeal was timely filed, but service was not perfected until after the deadline to appeal had expired, the Board applied the test for excusing defective service.) (When an appeal is rejected by the Board’s Appeals Office, the opposing party is not required to file a response.) more or view all topics or full text. |
42 | 31 | 08/16/17 |
| A451E |
Berkeley Unified School District
1107.18000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD; Review of Findings Not Excepted To
(An appeal of an administrative determination “must state the specific issue(s) of procedure, fact, law or rationale that is appealed and state the grounds for the appeal.” (PERB Regulation 32360, subd. (c).) Unless circumstances indicate otherwise, we consider only those issues properly raised.) more or view all topics or full text. |
42 | 31 | 08/16/17 |
| A443E |
Morgan Hill Unified School District
1107.01000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD; Exceptions; Responses to Exceptions; Standing; Extensions of Time/Late Filing/Waiver
(A letter placing a unit modification petition in abeyance pending the outcome of a decertification petition is an interlocutory order, and therefore must be appealed pursuant to PERB Regulation 32380, not PERB Regulation 32350.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 107 | 12/13/16 |
| A443E |
Morgan Hill Unified School District
1107.12000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD; Interlocutory Appeal
(A letter placing a unit modification petition in abeyance pending the outcome of a decertification petition is an interlocutory order, and therefore must be appealed pursuant to PERB Regulation 32380, not PERB Regulation 32350.) (The Board will not entertain an appeal of an interlocutory order unless the Board agent joins in the request.) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 107 | 12/13/16 |
| A443E |
Morgan Hill Unified School District
1302.04000: REPRESENTATION ISSUES; DECERTIFICATION; Bar To
(The only grounds on which decertification petitions may be dismissed prior to an election are those enumerated in PERB Regulations 32770 (30 percent proof of support) and 32776 (representation bar and contract bar).) more or view all topics or full text. |
41 | 107 | 12/13/16 |
| 2568S |
State of California (Department of State Hospitals) (California Association of Psychiatric Technicians)
604.01000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INFORMATION; In General
An exclusive representative is entitled to all information that is “necessary and relevant” to the discharge of its duty to represent bargaining unit employees. An employer’s failure or refusal to provide such information violates the duty to bargain in good faith unless the employer proves the information is “plainly irrelevant” or raises a valid defense to production of the information. (p. 12) more or view all topics or full text. |
43 | 3 | 06/12/18 |
| 2568S |
State of California (Department of State Hospitals) (California Association of Psychiatric Technicians)
604.03000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INFORMATION; Form of Information Provided; Costs
An employer may be excused from compliance with an information request if the requested information does not exist. But where the requested information exists in some form, the fact that the employer may have to compile it from various sources does not excuse the employer from producing it unless compliance would be unduly burdensome. The burden of proving this defense is on the employer. (p. 15) An assertion that compliance with an information request would be unduly burdensome must be timely raised so the parties can negotiate over how to best eliminate or reduce the employer’s burden. (p. 16) PERB refused to consider the employer’s evidence that compiling the requested information would be unduly burdensome because the employer did not assert the potential burden of creating the requested list until the underlying administrative hearing. The employer’s failure to timely assert this response deprived the union of an opportunity to negotiate a path by which the information might be provided in a less burdensome manner. (p. 16) more or view all topics or full text. |
43 | 3 | 06/12/18 |
| 2568S |
State of California (Department of State Hospitals) (California Association of Psychiatric Technicians)
604.04000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; REFUSAL TO PROVIDE INFORMATION; Confidentiality; Privacy
Constitutional privacy interests may limit a union’s right to obtain confidential information. A claim that disclosure of requested information would implicate confidentiality interests must be made in a timely fashion so the parties can meet and confer over how to ameliorate the privacy concern. (p. 14) PERB rejected DSH’s assertion of confidentiality for two reasons. First, DSH first raised the concern 15 days after receipt of the Union’s request. Without opining whether 15 days constitutes a bright line rule, PERB found that DSH’s response was untimely in this case because it came after the 14-day period to initiate a complaint under the MOU had ended, depriving the Union an opportunity negotiate over how to accommodate any privacy interests so that it might review the requested information before the filing period closed. (pp. 14-15) Second, DSH only asserted confidentiality concerns over the list of bargaining unit members who had received similar formal corrective actions. It did not notify the Union of any confidentiality concerns over other subjects until the parties’ dispute was before PERB. (p. 15) Under these circumstances, PERB rejected the employer’s confidentiality defense as untimely. more or view all topics or full text. |
43 | 3 | 06/12/18 |
| 2568S |
State of California (Department of State Hospitals) (California Association of Psychiatric Technicians)
608.07000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES; Waiver by Union; Contract Waivers; Bargaining History Estoppel; Disclaimer; Supersession
The bargaining contract allowed Union representatives to review employee personnel and supervisory files only if properly authorized by the employee. (pp. 3-4) Accordingly, DSH argued that the Union waived its right to receive the requested information absent authorization. However, a “waiver by contract” defense is an affirmative defense that must be pled in the respondent’s answer to the complaint or it is waived. (pp. 13-14) more or view all topics or full text. |
43 | 3 | 06/12/18 |
Notice Regarding Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (“AI”) at PERB
For information about use of AI in PERB filings, see Atwater Elementary Teachers Association, CTA/NEA (Garcia) (2025) PERB Decision No. 2995-E and our FAQ.
