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DecisionDescriptionPERC Vol.PERC IndexDate
3017E Chino Valley Unified School District
401.07000: EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION, EMPLOYER CONDUCT AFFECTING ORGANIZING, UNION ACCESS; SOLICITATION, AND OTHER UNION RIGHTS; Display of Union Insignia
Irrespective of enforcement, a rule that bans a category of conduct that could include protected activity as well as unprotected activity is unlawful because of this tendency to chill protected activity. A school district’s ban on the display of “flags,” broadly defined, encompassed union insignia and was therefore presumptively unlawful. The district failed to make a concrete, fact-based evidentiary showing justifying the policy’s restriction on union insignia. (pp. 20-24.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 152 04/20/26
3017E Chino Valley Unified School District
401.07000: EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION, EMPLOYER CONDUCT AFFECTING ORGANIZING, UNION ACCESS; SOLICITATION, AND OTHER UNION RIGHTS; Display of Union Insignia
School district’s ban on the display of “flags,” broadly defined, encompassed union insignia. (p. 22.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 152 04/20/26
3017E Chino Valley Unified School District
401.07000: EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION, EMPLOYER CONDUCT AFFECTING ORGANIZING, UNION ACCESS; SOLICITATION, AND OTHER UNION RIGHTS; Display of Union Insignia
The mere possibility of disruption is not sufficient to establish a special circumstance justifying a prohibition on displaying union insignia in a classroom. Instead, the employer must make a concrete, fact-based showing of special circumstances justifying a narrowly tailored restriction on any display of union insignia. (pp. 19-20.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 152 04/20/26
3017E Chino Valley Unified School District
401.07000: EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION, EMPLOYER CONDUCT AFFECTING ORGANIZING, UNION ACCESS; SOLICITATION, AND OTHER UNION RIGHTS; Display of Union Insignia
Employees’ presumptive right to wear union buttons attaches in instructional settings. (p. 19.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 152 04/20/26
3017E Chino Valley Unified School District
401.07000: EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION, EMPLOYER CONDUCT AFFECTING ORGANIZING, UNION ACCESS; SOLICITATION, AND OTHER UNION RIGHTS; Display of Union Insignia
In contrast to solicitation and distribution of literature, display of union insignia does not inherently involve an interruption from work. Therefore, employees’ presumptive right to display union insignia is not limited to non-working time or to non-work areas. (p. 19.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 152 04/20/26
3017E Chino Valley Unified School District
401.07000: EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION, EMPLOYER CONDUCT AFFECTING ORGANIZING, UNION ACCESS; SOLICITATION, AND OTHER UNION RIGHTS; Display of Union Insignia
California’s public sector employees, like private sector employees, have a right to display union insignia in the workplace, absent an employer’s proof of “special circumstances” justifying a prohibition. (p. 18.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 152 04/20/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
1100.03000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; CHARGE; Standing
The Board partially overruled California Union of Safety Employees (Trevisanut, et al.) (1993) PERB Decision No. 1029-S, Monterey Peninsula Community College District (2002) PERB Decision No. 1492, San Francisco Unified School District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2000, and similar decisions to the extent they can be interpreted as categorically barring all charging party employees from challenging any conduct occurring after separation from employment. This change does not alter any statutory provision identifying which individuals and entities can file a charge; rather, it resolves a latent tension in PERB’s precedent by clarifying employees’ right to challenge post-separation conduct that is integrally tied to the employment relationship. (pp. 5-6.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
1100.03000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; CHARGE; Standing
A categorical bar against charges by a former employee that challenge post-separation conduct would undercut fundamental labor law principles, such as: (1) it is unlawful to retaliate against or interfere with the right to use PERB processes (see Trustees of the California State University (East Bay) (2014) PERB Decision No. 2391-H, p. 39 [remedying discrimination for using PERB processes is “critical” to PERB’s “function of preserving those processes from abuse”]); and (2) even when an employer has cause to issue discipline, it may not prospectively bar employees from communicating with one another about such discipline or other employment matters. (Claremont Unified School District (2019) PERB Decision No. 2654, p. 11 & p.18, fn. 15 [noting that California’s public sector labor relations laws contain “no more fundamental right” than the right to communicate with coworkers, and finding employer acted unlawfully when, after issuing employee a notice of notice of intent to dismiss, it barred employee from contacting coworkers].) (pp. 4-5.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
1100.03000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; CHARGE; Standing
An employee’s post separation allegations against an employer or a union are actionable if they are integrally tied to the employment relationship and satisfy all other substantive and procedural requirements. For an employee’s charge against an employer, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct arise directly from the employment relationship or its termination. (See, e.g., Hartnell Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2452, pp. 30-33.) When the respondent is a union, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct directly involve the union’s acts or omissions in a matter in which it owes the employee a duty of fair representation. (See, e.g., Service Employees International Union United Healthcare Workers West (Lacy) (2016) PERB Decision No. 2486-M, adopting proposed decision at pp. 4-7.) (pp. 4-5.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
1100.03000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; CHARGE; Standing
Because the laws PERB enforces explicitly protect applicants for employment or reemployment (see, e.g., EERA, § 3543.5(a)), there is no question that these laws bar an employer from impeding a former employee's attempt to secure subsequent employment, where such conduct constitutes retaliation for protected activity. (Monterey Peninsula Unified School District (2017) PERB Decision No. 2530, pp. 7-8.) (p. 4, fn. 2.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
801.01000: UNION UNFAIR PRACTICES;RESTRAINT, COERCION, INTERFERENCE OR DISCRIMINATION; In General
The Board partially overruled California Union of Safety Employees (Trevisanut, et al.) (1993) PERB Decision No. 1029-S, Monterey Peninsula Community College District (2002) PERB Decision No. 1492, San Francisco Unified School District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2000, and similar decisions to the extent they can be interpreted as categorically barring all charging party employees from challenging any conduct occurring after separation from employment. This change does not alter any statutory provision identifying which individuals and entities can file a charge; rather, it resolves a latent tension in PERB’s precedent by clarifying employees’ right to challenge post-separation conduct that is integrally tied to the employment relationship. (pp. 5-6.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
801.01000: UNION UNFAIR PRACTICES;RESTRAINT, COERCION, INTERFERENCE OR DISCRIMINATION; In General
An employee’s post separation allegations against an employer or a union are actionable if they are integrally tied to the employment relationship and satisfy all other substantive and procedural requirements. For an employee’s charge against an employer, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct arise directly from the employment relationship or its termination. (See, e.g., Hartnell Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2452, pp. 30-33.) When the respondent is a union, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct directly involve the union’s acts or omissions in a matter in which it owes the employee a duty of fair representation. (See, e.g., Service Employees International Union United Healthcare Workers West (Lacy) (2016) PERB Decision No. 2486-M, adopting proposed decision at pp. 4-7.) (pp. 4-5.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
502.01000: EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION; PERSONS PROTECTED; In General
The Board partially overruled California Union of Safety Employees (Trevisanut, et al.) (1993) PERB Decision No. 1029-S, Monterey Peninsula Community College District (2002) PERB Decision No. 1492, San Francisco Unified School District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2000, and similar decisions to the extent they can be interpreted as categorically barring all charging party employees from challenging any conduct occurring after separation from employment. This change does not alter any statutory provision identifying which individuals and entities can file a charge; rather, it resolves a latent tension in PERB’s precedent by clarifying employees’ right to challenge post-separation conduct that is integrally tied to the employment relationship. (pp. 5-6.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
502.01000: EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION; PERSONS PROTECTED; In General
PERB precedent recognizes that a union may pursue a charge challenging employer conduct that tends to harm employee rights even when that conduct is directed at an individual who lacks the right to file a charge, such as a non-covered supervisor or manager. (State of California (Department of Consumer Affairs) (2004) PERB Decision No. 1711-S, pp. 18-19.) This principle—that an unfair practice charge does not necessarily turn on the status of the individual against whom conduct is directed—further supports the conclusion that there is no categorical bar on challenges to adverse actions occurring after an employee’s separation. (p. 5, fn. 3.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
502.01000: EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION; PERSONS PROTECTED; In General
Because the laws PERB enforces explicitly protect applicants for employment or reemployment (see, e.g., EERA, § 3543.5(a)), there is no question that these laws bar an employer from impeding a former employee's attempt to secure subsequent employment, where such conduct constitutes retaliation for protected activity. (Monterey Peninsula Unified School District (2017) PERB Decision No. 2530, pp. 7-8.) (p. 4, fn. 2.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
502.01000: EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION; PERSONS PROTECTED; In General
An employee’s post separation allegations against an employer or a union are actionable if they are integrally tied to the employment relationship and satisfy all other substantive and procedural requirements. For an employee’s charge against an employer, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct arise directly from the employment relationship or its termination. (See, e.g., Hartnell Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2452, pp. 30-33.) When the respondent is a union, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct directly involve the union’s acts or omissions in a matter in which it owes the employee a duty of fair representation. (See, e.g., Service Employees International Union United Healthcare Workers West (Lacy) (2016) PERB Decision No. 2486-M, adopting proposed decision at pp. 4-7.) (pp. 4-5.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
400.01000: EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION; EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE WITH, RESTRAINT, OR COERCION OF EMPLOYEES; In General; Standards
An employee’s post separation allegations against an employer or a union are actionable if they are integrally tied to the employment relationship and satisfy all other substantive and procedural requirements. For an employee’s charge against an employer, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct arise directly from the employment relationship or its termination. (See, e.g., Hartnell Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2452, pp. 30-33.) When the respondent is a union, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct directly involve the union’s acts or omissions in a matter in which it owes the employee a duty of fair representation. (See, e.g., Service Employees International Union United Healthcare Workers West (Lacy) (2016) PERB Decision No. 2486-M, adopting proposed decision at pp. 4-7.) (pp. 4-5.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
400.01000: EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE, RESTRAINT, COERCION; EMPLOYER INTERFERENCE WITH, RESTRAINT, OR COERCION OF EMPLOYEES; In General; Standards
Former employee’s charge did not state a prima facie case of interference or retaliation, where facts former employee had alleged would not establish that the employer’s lawsuit against him both lacked a reasonable basis and was filed for an unlawful purpose. (See, e.g., Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3, AFL-CIO (Wagner et al.) (2021) PERB Decision No. 2782-M, pp. 8-10 [PERB applies a qualified litigation privilege based on the principles first set forth in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd. (1983) 461 U.S. 731, requiring a charging party to show that allegedly unlawful litigation lacked a reasonable basis and was filed for an unlawful purpose].) The employer’s lawsuit alleged that former employee violated a settlement agreement by pursuing his PERB charge. Because the charge was protected activity, former employee adequately alleged facts that, if proven, would establish that the lawsuit constituted retaliation for protected activity. However, former employee did not alleged facts that would show the lawsuit was objectively baseless. (pp. 2, 6.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
200.01000: PARTIES; DEFINITIONS; WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE? (SEE 502 AND 1309); In General
The Board partially overruled California Union of Safety Employees (Trevisanut, et al.) (1993) PERB Decision No. 1029-S, Monterey Peninsula Community College District (2002) PERB Decision No. 1492, San Francisco Unified School District (2009) PERB Decision No. 2000, and similar decisions to the extent they can be interpreted as categorically barring all charging party employees from challenging any conduct occurring after separation from employment. This change does not alter any statutory provision identifying which individuals and entities can file a charge; rather, it resolves a latent tension in PERB’s precedent by clarifying employees’ right to challenge post-separation conduct that is integrally tied to the employment relationship. (pp. 5-6.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
200.01000: PARTIES; DEFINITIONS; WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE? (SEE 502 AND 1309); In General
A categorical bar against charges by a former employee that challenge post-separation conduct would undercut fundamental labor law principles, such as: (1) it is unlawful to retaliate against or interfere with the right to use PERB processes (see Trustees of the California State University (East Bay) (2014) PERB Decision No. 2391-H, p. 39 [remedying discrimination for using PERB processes is “critical” to PERB’s “function of preserving those processes from abuse”]); and (2) even when an employer has cause to issue discipline, it may not prospectively bar employees from communicating with one another about such discipline or other employment matters. (Claremont Unified School District (2019) PERB Decision No. 2654, p. 11 & p.18, fn. 15 [noting that California’s public sector labor relations laws contain “no more fundamental right” than the right to communicate with coworkers, and finding employer acted unlawfully when, after issuing employee a notice of notice of intent to dismiss, it barred employee from contacting coworkers].) (pp. 4-5.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
3018E Downey Unified School District
200.01000: PARTIES; DEFINITIONS; WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE? (SEE 502 AND 1309); In General
An employee’s post separation allegations against an employer or a union are actionable if they are integrally tied to the employment relationship and satisfy all other substantive and procedural requirements. For an employee’s charge against an employer, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct arise directly from the employment relationship or its termination. (See, e.g., Hartnell Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2452, pp. 30-33.) When the respondent is a union, “integrally tied” normally requires that the post-separation conduct directly involve the union’s acts or omissions in a matter in which it owes the employee a duty of fair representation. (See, e.g., Service Employees International Union United Healthcare Workers West (Lacy) (2016) PERB Decision No. 2486-M, adopting proposed decision at pp. 4-7.) (pp. 4-5.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 154 04/24/26
2915Ha Trustees of the California State University
1402.05000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER; By Delaying or Failing to Request Negotiations
Irrespective of whether an employer provides formal notice or relies on actual notice, such notice is only adequate (sometimes referred to as “sufficient” or “reasonable”) if: (1) the person receiving formal notice or obtaining actual notice is a union official with authority to act on behalf of the organization on the matter in question; (2) the union official recognizes, or reasonably should recognize, the change in or potential impact on a bargainable topic; and (3) there remains sufficient time for the union to consult with bargaining unit members, formulate a plan of action, draft information requests and receive responses, craft counterarguments and/or proposals, and bargain in good faith to impact or agreement before the employer reaches a firm decision (for bargainable decisions) or begins implementation (for decisions outside the scope of representation that have bargainable effects). Thus, the amount of notice that is sufficient will necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case, and parties would do well to err on the side of caution rather than assuming that only a particular amount of time is all that the law requires. (pp. 23-24.) Although insufficient notice is an element of the prima facie case, and therefore part of the charging party’s burden for proving a unilateral change allegation, where the facts demonstrate, or the employer admits, that no formal notice was provided to the representative, the burden is the employer’s to prove its affirmative defense of waiver, and not the union’s to prove lack of notice as part of its prima facie case. However, if the employer establishes that the union obtained actual notice, the union has the burden of proof as to the temporal sufficiency or insufficiency of such actual notice. (pp. 24-25.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 148 04/10/26
2915Ha Trustees of the California State University
1402.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; WAIVER; In General
Irrespective of whether an employer provides formal notice or relies on actual notice, such notice is only adequate (sometimes referred to as “sufficient” or “reasonable”) if: (1) the person receiving formal notice or obtaining actual notice is a union official with authority to act on behalf of the organization on the matter in question; (2) the union official recognizes, or reasonably should recognize, the change in or potential impact on a bargainable topic; and (3) there remains sufficient time for the union to consult with bargaining unit members, formulate a plan of action, draft information requests and receive responses, craft counterarguments and/or proposals, and bargain in good faith to impact or agreement before the employer reaches a firm decision (for bargainable decisions) or begins implementation (for decisions outside the scope of representation that have bargainable effects). Thus, the amount of notice that is sufficient will necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case, and parties would do well to err on the side of caution rather than assuming that only a particular amount of time is all that the law requires. (pp. 23-24.) Although insufficient notice is an element of the prima facie case, and therefore part of the charging party’s burden for proving a unilateral change allegation, where the facts demonstrate, or the employer admits, that no formal notice was provided to the representative, the burden is the employer’s to prove its affirmative defense of waiver, and not the union’s to prove lack of notice as part of its prima facie case. However, if the employer establishes that the union obtained actual notice, the union has the burden of proof as to the temporal sufficiency or insufficiency of such actual notice. (pp. 24-25.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 148 04/10/26
2915Ha Trustees of the California State University
608.01000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES; In General
Irrespective of whether an employer provides formal notice or relies on actual notice, such notice is only adequate (sometimes referred to as “sufficient” or “reasonable”) if: (1) the person receiving formal notice or obtaining actual notice is a union official with authority to act on behalf of the organization on the matter in question; (2) the union official recognizes, or reasonably should recognize, the change in or potential impact on a bargainable topic; and (3) there remains sufficient time for the union to consult with bargaining unit members, formulate a plan of action, draft information requests and receive responses, craft counterarguments and/or proposals, and bargain in good faith to impact or agreement before the employer reaches a firm decision (for bargainable decisions) or begins implementation (for decisions outside the scope of representation that have bargainable effects). Thus, the amount of notice that is sufficient will necessarily depend on the circumstances of each case, and parties would do well to err on the side of caution rather than assuming that only a particular amount of time is all that the law requires. (pp. 23-24.) Although insufficient notice is an element of the prima facie case, and therefore part of the charging party’s burden for proving a unilateral change allegation, where the facts demonstrate, or the employer admits, that no formal notice was provided to the representative, the burden is the employer’s to prove its affirmative defense of waiver, and not the union’s to prove lack of notice as part of its prima facie case. However, if the employer establishes that the union obtained actual notice, the union has the burden of proof as to the temporal sufficiency or insufficiency of such actual notice. (pp. 24-25.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 148 04/10/26
2915Ha Trustees of the California State University
608.01000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; DEFENSES; In General
California State University claimed that it could address all relevant effects and implementation issues of relaxed student immunization policy as part of accommodating individual faculty members with disabilities. In reviewing this matter, the appellate court rejected this argument, noting that “laws prohibiting discrimination do not preclude enforcement of the right to be free from discrimination through the collective bargaining process.” (Trustees of the California State University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 [collecting cases].) (p. 19.) more or view all topics or full text.		 50 148 04/10/26