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DecisionDescriptionPERC Vol.PERC IndexDate
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
1107.01000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD; Exceptions; Responses to Exceptions; Standing; Extensions of Time/Late Filing/Waiver
Because the Board’s remedy ordering the County to dismiss a severance petition sufficiently resolved the matter, the Board exercised its discretion not to address the remainder of the exceptions. (p. 3.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
750.01000: EMPLOYER ADOPTION/ENFORCEMENT OF UNREASONABLE RULE; In General
When a charging party successfully challenges an MMBA employer’s representation decision, PERB must direct the employer to cease applying its unlawful decision and to instead act consistently with the Board’s decision. (County of Monterey (2022) PERB Decision No. 2821-M, p. 22 [directing county to grant unit modification petition and cease and desist from unreasonably applying local rules]; City of Long Beach (2021) PERB Decision No. 2771-M, p. 20 [directing city to process decertification petition in a manner consistent with PERB’s decision]; Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital District (2020) PERB Decision No. 2689-M, p. 39 [directing hospital district to grant petition for recognition and cease and desist from unreasonably applying local rules].) Where severance petition sought an outcome that is inconsistent with the County’s local rules, the MMBA, and precedent, the Board directed the County to dismiss the severance petition and the County’s Civil Service Commission to cease and desist from finding the proposed new unit to be appropriate. (p. 65.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
750.01000: EMPLOYER ADOPTION/ENFORCEMENT OF UNREASONABLE RULE; In General
A charging party has the burden of proof to the extent it claims that an MMBA employer’s unit determination violated the employer’s local rules or was unreasonable, and PERB does not substitute its judgment for that of the employer if reasonable minds could differ as to how applicable standards apply to the record. (County of Monterey (2022) PERB Decision No. 2821-M, p. 9.) The amount of deference PERB affords an MMBA employer’s unit determination varies. For instance, if the MMBA employer provides a sufficient explanation of its unit determination, PERB applies a rebuttable presumption that the determination is reasonable. (Id. at p. 10.) In contrast, if the employer merely states the applicable standard and then provides “a conclusion without also including the analytical process in its decision,” the presumption of reasonableness falls away. (Ibid.) The County’s failure to draft a written decision to sufficiently explain the decisionmaker’s analysis opened the decision to a greater degree of scrutiny. (pp. 19-20.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
750.01000: EMPLOYER ADOPTION/ENFORCEMENT OF UNREASONABLE RULE; In General
Challenges to an MMBA employer’s unit determination normally allege that the employer either maintained a facially unlawful local rule, violated one or more of its rules, or applied its rules in an unreasonable or unlawful manner. (MMBA, §§ 3507(d) & 3509(b) (c); PERB Reg. 32603(f) & (g); County of Monterey (2022) PERB Decision No. 2821-M, p. 21; County of Orange (2016) PERB Decision No. 2478-M, p.16.) (pp. 18-19.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
750.01000: EMPLOYER ADOPTION/ENFORCEMENT OF UNREASONABLE RULE; In General
MMBA section 3507(a) authorizes public agencies to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations after consultation in good faith with representatives of a recognized employee organization or organizations for the administration of employer-employee relations.” Such local rules may include provisions for recognizing employee organizations and determining appropriate bargaining units. (MMBA, § 3507(a)(3) & (a)(4); County of Monterey (2022) PERB Decision No. 2821-M, p. 9.) (p. 18.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
603.04000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; BYPASSING EXCLUSIVE REP; Circumvention of Union; Direct Dealing With Employees
MMBA-covered employees “have the right to represent themselves individually in their employment relations with the public agency.” (MMBA, § 3502; see also § 3503 [MMBA does not “prohibit any employee from appearing in his own behalf in his employment relations with the public agency”]; Alameda County Medical Center (2004) PERB Decision No. 1620a-M, p. 3 [MMBA section 3502 protects unionized employees’ right “to represent themselves in their employment relations with the public agency employer” but does not authorize employer to bypass union and negotiate separate employment terms with individual employees]; Alameda County Medical Center (2004) PERB Decision No. 1620-M, p. 2 [MMBA section 3503 protects unionized employees’ right “to meet with the employer without the employee organization” but does not authorize the employer to bypass the union and negotiate separate employment terms with individual employees].) (p. 36.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
411.01000: EMPLOYER MASS COMMUNICATIONS UNDER SECTION 3553; In General
The Prohibition on Public Employers Deterring or Discouraging Union Membership (PEDD) applies to employers subject to any of California’s public sector labor relations statutes, including the MMBA. (PEDD, § 3552(c).) Thus, any entity that constitutes an MMBA employer is automatically a PEDD employer. (PEDD, § 3522(c); El Camino Healthcare District, et al. (2023) PERB Decision No. 2868-M, p. 4, fn. 5.) (p. 62, fn. 16.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
301.11000: UNFAIR PRACTICE ISSUES; STRIKES, SLOWDOWNS AND WORK STOPPAGES; Essential Employees
Public defenders are akin to other county employees whose right to strike is not absolute due to the critical work they do. This can include not only physicians and certain court personnel, but multiple other county classifications whose incumbents protect the public 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. (See County of San Mateo (2019) PERB Order No. IR-61-M, pp. 10-21 & 26.) Public defenders and other attorneys employed in the public sector are not prohibited from striking, as long as the attorney does not “overstep[] ethical boundaries,” meaning that the attorney “violates actual disciplinary rules, most particularly rules pertaining to the attorney’s duty to represent the client faithfully, competently, and confidentially.” (Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 552; accord County of San Bernardino (Office of the Public Defender) (2015) PERB Decision No. 2423-M, p. 35 [public defenders have full MMBA rights, provided they do not violate the California Rules of Professional Conduct].) Similarly, physicians employed in the public sector have full MMBA rights, provided they use professional judgment to assure compliance with professional codes. Such consideration may lead to a range of actions to protect clients or patients, including making alternate arrangements, reasonable delays, or negotiating line passes whereby the union exempts employees who play important roles in the criminal justice or health care systems from striking to allow compliance with mandatory court deadlines or, where alternate arrangements cannot be made, to protect against substantial and imminent risk to patients’ health and safety. (pp. 43-47 & fn. 11.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
301.11000: UNFAIR PRACTICE ISSUES; STRIKES, SLOWDOWNS AND WORK STOPPAGES; Essential Employees
Determining “whether a particular employee’s job is so essential that the employee may not legally strike is a complex and fact-intensive matter.” (City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2010) 49 Cal.4th 597, 601.) The starting point is “the nature of the services the alleged essential employees perform and whether the employer has clearly demonstrated that disruption of such services for the length of the strike would imminently and substantially threaten public health or safety.” (County of San Mateo (2019) PERB Order No. IR-61-M, p. 8.) (pp. 42-43.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
2975M County of Kern and Kern County Civil Service Commission
300.04000: UNFAIR PRACTICE ISSUES; PROTECTED ACTIVITIES; Individual/Concerted/Activities/Self-Representation
MMBA-covered employees “have the right to represent themselves individually in their employment relations with the public agency.” (MMBA, § 3502; see also § 3503 [MMBA does not “prohibit any employee from appearing in his own behalf in his employment relations with the public agency”]; Alameda County Medical Center (2004) PERB Decision No. 1620a-M, p. 3 [MMBA section 3502 protects unionized employees’ right “to represent themselves in their employment relations with the public agency employer” but does not authorize employer to bypass union and negotiate separate employment terms with individual employees]; Alameda County Medical Center (2004) PERB Decision No. 1620-M, p. 2 [MMBA section 3503 protects unionized employees’ right “to meet with the employer without the employee organization” but does not authorize the employer to bypass the union and negotiate separate employment terms with individual employees].) (p. 36.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 46 07/31/25
A531E Fresno Unified School District
1308.01000: REPRESENTATION ISSUES; SEVERANCE; In General
Severance petition denied where a union sought to transfer three department classifications from a bargaining unit represented by another union to an existing unit which it represented. PERB’s severance procedures do not permit the transfer of one group of employees from an existing bargaining unit to another existing unit. Rather, severance is a process whereby classifications are carved out of a larger bargaining unit into their own, standalone unit. more or view all topics or full text.
50 43 07/28/25
2955Ea Hughson Unified School District
1311.01000: REPRESENTATION ISSUES; JUDICIAL REVIEW, REPRESENTATION, DECISIONS; In General
Under section 3542(a)(1) of the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) and PERB Regulation 32500, a union or employer dissatisfied with a final PERB unit determination decision may ask the Board to allow an appeal by joining in a request for judicial review. These provisions categorically do not apply in any unfair practice case. (p. 1.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 35 07/14/25
2955Ea Hughson Unified School District
1107.10000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES;PROCEDURES BEFORE THE BOARD; Request for Reconsideration
There is no right to request reconsideration of a Board decision resolving an appeal from a dismissal of an unfair practice charge. (Berkeley Federation of Teachers, Local 1078 (Crowell) (2015) PERB Decision No. 2405a, pp. 12-14.) In such cases, there is an extremely narrow right to seek judicial review. Specifically, a dissatisfied charging party may file a superior court petition for writ of mandate only if: (1) the Board’s decision violated a constitutional right; (2) the Board exceeded its statutory powers; or (3) the Board’s decision was based on an erroneous statutory construction. (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 269-270.) (pp. 1-2.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 35 07/14/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
1405.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; RES JUDICATA; In General
Where PERB and a superior court have concurrent jurisdiction and a court stays litigation to allow PERB’s adjudication to proceed first, there remains the possibility that the stayed superior court action may proceed after the PERB matter is complete. (Fresno Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 259, 274.) The PERB resolution may or may not impact the outcome of any such later superior court litigation, depending on the circumstances. For instance, collateral estoppel normally applies to common issues (if any) already litigated before PERB. (See Noble v. Draper (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [standard issue preclusion and claim preclusion principles apply when parties to a judicial matter have previously litigated before an administrative agency].) Moreover, even when certain elements of the collateral estoppel test are not satisfied, courts typically defer to PERB’s conclusions on labor relations issues within its expertise. (See Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Modesto City School Dist. (1983) 136 Cal.App.3d 881, 894 [noting the importance of deferring to PERB’s expertise in appropriate circumstances].) (p. 8.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
1404.02000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT/ INTERPRETATION; Board's Jurisdiction To Interpret Contracts
PERB’s jurisdiction is concurrent rather than exclusive if the conduct at issue arguably breached a collective bargaining agreement while also constituting arguably prohibited or arguably protected conduct under a PERB-enforced labor relations statute. (Fresno Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 259 (Fresno).) Fresno specifically relied upon EERA’s provision stating that PERB “shall not have the authority to enforce agreements between the parties, and shall not issue a complaint on any charge based on alleged violation of any agreement that would not also constitute an unfair practice under this chapter.” (Id. at p. 264, quoting Gov. Code, § 3541.5(b).) Accordingly, the court held, PERB must make the initial unfair practice determination, “even though the practice might also violate the terms of a contract,” but PERB “is not permitted to bootstrap its jurisdiction by deeming mere contractual violations to be unfair practices.” (Ibid.) (p. 7.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
1100.05000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; CHARGE; Dismissal of Charge; Appeal
In resolving a dismissal appeal, the Board reviews the Office of the General Counsel’s (OGC) decision de novo. (City and County of San Francisco (2020) PERB Decision No. 2712-M, p. 2.) As when the Board addresses exceptions to a proposed decision, it has discretion whether to resolve disputed issues that would not impact the outcome. (City of San Ramon (2018) PERB Decision No. 2571-M, p. 5.) In the unique circumstances of this case, the Board exercised its discretion to resolve the District’s appeal, even though it would not impact the outcome. (p. 4.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
1100.05000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; CHARGE; Dismissal of Charge; Appeal
When considering an appeal of the dismissal of a charge by PERB’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC), the Board assumes the charging party’s factual allegations are true and views them in the light most favorable to the charging party. (City and County of San Francisco (2020) PERB Decision No. 2712-M, p. 2.) The Board relies on the respondent’s responses only to the extent that they neither explicitly nor implicitly create a factual conflict with charging party’s allegations. (Ibid.) (p. 2, fn. 2.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
1100.01000: CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES; CHARGE; In General/Prima Facie Case
In processing an unfair practice charge, PERB’s Office of the General Counsel must determine whether the allegations state a prima facie case of any unfair practice, even if the charging party does not assert certain colorable theories. (State of California (State Water Resources Control Board) (2022) PERB Decision No. 2830-S, p. 13, fn. 12; County of Santa Clara (2022) PERB Decision No. 2820-M, p. 2, fn. 2; County of San Joaquin (2021) PERB Decision No. 2761-M, p. 19; San Jose/Evergreen Federation of Teachers, AFT Local 6157, and American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (Crawford et al.) (2020) PERB Decision No. 2744, p. 23; Hartnell Community College District (2015) PERB Decision No. 2452, pp. 53-54.) (p. 9.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
1000.02117: SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION; Released Time
Reimbursement for the cost of release time falls within the scope of representation. (See, e.g., Centinela Valley Union High School District (2014) PERB Decision No. 2378, p. 8 [repudiation of release time provision in a CBA falls squarely within PERB’s jurisdiction].) (p. 10.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
602.06000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Generalized Effect or Continuing Impact
Past practice can be used to establish the unwritten status quo from which PERB assesses an alleged unilateral change, and it can also be used as an interpretive aid in assessing ambiguous written language. (Pittsburg Unified School District (2022) PERB Decision No. 2833, pp. 10-11 & fn. 6.) In the former instance, a past practice establishes the status quo only if it was “regular and consistent” or “historic and accepted.” (Ibid; County of Merced (2020) PERB Decision No. 2740-M, p. 13, fn. 9.) However, the inquiry is fundamentally different when analyzing the parties’ past practice to help ascertain the meaning of ambiguous contract language. (Antelope Valley Community College District (2018) PERB Decision No. 2618, p. 21.) In the latter circumstance, the past practice is but one tool for interpreting the contract, and therefore need not be as definitive as when it is defining the status quo in the absence of a contract term. (Id. at p. 22.) (pp. 10-11, fn. 4.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
602.05000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); New Policy or Application or Enforcement of Existing Policy in New Way
Deviation from contractual terms has a “generalized effect or continuing impact” if either: (1) the deviation changes a policy or employment term applicable to future situations; or (2) the respondent acts unilaterally based upon an incorrect legal interpretation or insistence on a non-existent legal right that could be relevant to future disputes. (Bellflower Unified School District (2021) PERB Decision No. 2796, pp. 15-16.) In contrast, “there is no cognizable unilateral change” when a contract breach is “a one-time mistake that has no likelihood of prospectively impacting rights or obligations.” (Id. at p. 19.) (pp. 11-12.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
602.03000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); Change in or Deviation from Written Agreement or Policy
There are three primary means of establishing a change in, or deviation from, the status quo: (1) a change or deviation from a written agreement or written policy; (2) a change or deviation from an established, unwritten past practice; or (3) a newly created policy or application or enforcement of existing policy in a new way. (Oakland Unified School District (2023) PERB Decision No. 2875, pp. 12-13.) Deviation from the terms of a contractual release time provision satisfies at least the first of the three means of showing a change or deviation from the status quo. (See, e.g., Centinela Valley Union High School District (2014) PERB Decision No. 2378, p. 8.) (pp. 10-11.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
602.01000: EMPLOYER REFUSAL TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH; UNILATERAL CHANGE (FOR NEGOT OF SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, SEE SEC 1000, SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION); In General
PERB’s modern unilateral change test frames the elements of a prima facie case as having four elements: (1) the respondent changed or deviated from the status quo; (2) the change or deviation concerned a matter within the scope of bargaining; (3) the change or deviation had a generalized effect or continuing impact on negotiable subjects; and (4) the respondent reached its decision without first providing adequate advance notice of the proposed change to the charging party and bargaining in good faith over the decision, at the charging party’s request, until the parties reached an agreement or a lawful impasse. (Bellflower Unified School District (2021) PERB Decision No. 2796, p. 9; cf. Regents of the University of California (Los Angeles) (2025) PERB Decision No. 2942-H, p. 17 [“[F]or much of PERB’s history, precedent consolidated the unilateral change test into just two elements”].) The same principles apply when the respondent is a union. (San Francisco County Superior Court & Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee (2018) PERB Decision No. 2609-I, p. 7.) (pp. 9-10.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
102.02000: PERB: OPERATION, JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY; SCOPE OF PERB JURISDICTION; Concurrent or Conflicting Jurisdiction with Other Agencies or Courts; Interpretation or Enforcement of Other Statutes
Where PERB and a superior court have concurrent jurisdiction and a court stays litigation to allow PERB’s adjudication to proceed first, there remains the possibility that the stayed superior court action may proceed after the PERB matter is complete. (Fresno Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 259, 274.) The PERB resolution may or may not impact the outcome of any such later superior court litigation, depending on the circumstances. For instance, collateral estoppel normally applies to common issues (if any) already litigated before PERB. (See Noble v. Draper (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [standard issue preclusion and claim preclusion principles apply when parties to a judicial matter have previously litigated before an administrative agency].) Moreover, even when certain elements of the collateral estoppel test are not satisfied, courts typically defer to PERB’s conclusions on labor relations issues within its expertise. (See Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Modesto City School Dist. (1983) 136 Cal.App.3d 881, 894 [noting “the importance of deferring to the expertise of PERB in appropriate circumstances”].) (p. 8.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25
2966E Pomona Unified School District
102.02000: PERB: OPERATION, JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY; SCOPE OF PERB JURISDICTION; Concurrent or Conflicting Jurisdiction with Other Agencies or Courts; Interpretation or Enforcement of Other Statutes
PERB’s jurisdiction is concurrent rather than exclusive if the conduct at issue arguably breached a collective bargaining agreement while also constituting arguably prohibited or arguably protected conduct under a PERB-enforced labor relations statute. (Fresno Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 259 (Fresno).) Fresno specifically relied upon EERA’s provision stating that PERB “shall not have the authority to enforce agreements between the parties, and shall not issue a complaint on any charge based on alleged violation of any agreement that would not also constitute an unfair practice under this chapter.” (Id. at p. 264, quoting Gov. Code, § 3541.5(b).) Accordingly, the court held, PERB must make the initial unfair practice determination, “even though the practice might also violate the terms of a contract,” but PERB “is not permitted to bootstrap its jurisdiction by deeming mere contractual violations to be unfair practices.” (Ibid.) (p. 7.) more or view all topics or full text.
50 3 05/27/25