All notes for Subtopic 1407.01000 – General Principles
| Decision | Description | PERC Vol. | PERC Index | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2806E | * * * JUDICIAL APPEAL PENDING * * * Visalia Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Because MMBA section 3502.1 merely reinforces existing statutory provisions and given that EERA and the MMBA mirror one another in their main provisions protecting the right to participate in union activities, the Board found that the Legislature did not intend to prescribe differing rules and instead intended unfair practices under the differing statutes to be interpreted in a comparable manner. While including statutory language in only one of several laws dealing with the same general subject can demonstrate an intent to create differing rules, that principle does not apply universally and is not helpful or controlling where, as here, it would create an “inexplicable anomaly.” (p. 20.) more or view all topics or full text. | 46 | 115 | 02/07/22 |
| 2835H | Regents of the University of California 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles PERB’s fundamental task in statutory construction is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Regents of the University of California (2021) PERB Decision No. 2755-H, p. 20 (Regents); Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee & California Superior Courts of Region 2 (2020) PERB Decision No. 2701-I, p. 32 (Region 2).) In construing a statute, we first examine the statutory language, “affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning.” (Region 2, supra, PERB Decision No. 2701-I, p. 33.) If the statutory language is clear, we generally assume the Legislature meant what it said. (Ibid.; State of California (Office of the Inspector General) (2019) PERB Decision No. 2660-S, p. 15.) Moreover, we are to give statutes a “reasonable and common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers.” (Regents, supra, PERB Decision No. 2755-H, p. 20, internal citation omitted.) In doing so, we interpret a statutory provision with “reference to the whole system of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.” (Ibid., internal citation omitted; Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 14.) We turn to extrinsic aids such as legislative history and the wider historical circumstances of the statute’s enactment only when the plain meaning of a statute is unclear. (Santa Clara Valley Water District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2349-M, pp. 16-17.) (p. 13.) more or view all topics or full text. | 47 | 69 | 10/07/22 |
| A500E | Pasadena Area Community College District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that we must give “meaning to every word of the statute, if possible, [to] avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage.” (Santa Clara Valley Water District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2349-M, p. 16.) PERB’s regulations must be read as a whole so that every part is harmonized. (County of Santa Clara (2015) PERB Decision No. 2431-M, p. 16.) PERB cannot interpret a regulation in a manner that defeats its apparent purpose. (Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee & California Superior Courts Region 2 (2020) PERB Decision No. 2701-I, p. 36.) (pp. 10-11.) more or view all topics or full text. | 47 | 115 | 01/11/23 |
| A500E | Pasadena Area Community College District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The same interpretive principles apply to statutes and regulations. (Grossmont Union High School District (2018) PERB Order No. Ad-466, p. 3.) (p. 10, fn. 10.) more or view all topics or full text. | 47 | 115 | 01/11/23 |
| 1721E | San Francisco Unified School District and City and County of San Francisco 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that the term “or” has a disjunctive meaning. (Houge v. Ford (1955) 44 Cal.2d 706, 712 [285 P.2d 257] (Houge); see also, In re Jesusa (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 [10 Cal.Rptr.3d 205].) “In its ordinary sense, the function of the word ‘or’ is to mark an alternative such as ‘either this or that.’” (Houge at p. 712.) It is also a well-settled rule of statutory construction that qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [183 Cal.Rptr. 520].) Thus, where there is a disjunctive “or” before a final clause with a qualifying phrase, the qualifying phrase should be interpreted as only applying to that final clause. (See, e.g., Furtado v. Sierra Community College (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 876, 881 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 5891; Fischer v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 87 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 452].) To extend the application of a qualifying phrase back past the disjunctive “or” would violate accepted rules of statutory construction. (Hopkins v. Anderson (1933) 218 Cal. 62, 65 [21 P.2d 560]; County of Los Angeles v. Graves (1930) 210 Cal. 21, 26 [290 P. 444].) (pp. 9-10.) more or view all topics or full text. | 29 | 33 | 12/13/04 |
| 2819E | * * * JUDICIAL APPEAL PENDING * * * Cerritos Community College District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The fundamental task in interpreting statutory language is ascertaining the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Regents of the University of California (2021) PERB Decision No. 2755-H, p. 20.) When PERB interprets a statute, usually “we begin with its plain language, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning.” (Santa Clara Valley Water District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2349-M, p. 16, citing Shady Tree Farms, LLC v. Omni Financial, LLC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 131, 137.) But when the statute itself gives the words a special meaning different from their ordinary and usual meaning, we must follow that special meaning. (Irvine Valley College Academic Senate v. South Orange County Community College Dist. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1482, 1489.) If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we assume the Legislature meant what it said; the plain meaning controls and there is nothing to interpret or construe. (State of California (Office of the Inspector General) (2019) PERB Decision No. 2660-S, p. 15.) Only when the statutory terms are ambiguous may we resort to extrinsic sources such as maxims of construction and legislative history to discern legislative intent. (Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee & California Superior Courts of Region 2 (2020) PERB Decision No. 2701-I, p. 33.) (pp. 24-25.) more or view all topics or full text. | 46 | 168 | 05/06/22 |
| 2755H | Regents of the University of California 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles When interpreting statutory language, PERB begins with the fundamental rule that it should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous the construction intended by the Legislature is obvious from the language used. Statutes are to be given a reasonable and common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers. Further, every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. Where the provisions of a statute are subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, the interpretation which will harmonize rather than conflict with other provisions thereof should be adopted. (pp. 20-21.) Generally, when the Legislature uses a word or phrase in a particular sense in one statute, the word or phrase should be understood to carry the same meaning when it appears in another statute dealing with the same subject matter. Government Code sections 16645 and 3550 deal with the same subject matter—employer conduct related to employee decisions about union support. The Legislature’s use of “deter” in both statutes thus indicates it intended for the word to be interpreted similarly in each. (p. 23.) more or view all topics or full text. | 45 | 81 | 03/01/21 |
| 2702M | City of Sacramento 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Although federal judicial and administrative precedent is not binding on PERB, it often provides persuasive guidance in construing California’s public sector labor relations statutes. (p. 9, fn. 13.) more or view all topics or full text. | 44 | 153 | 03/25/20 |
| 2701I | Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Only where the plain meaning of a statute is unclear may PERB turn to other extrinsic sources to discern legislative intent, such as maxims of construction, legislative history, and the wider historical context of the statute’s enactment. (p. 33.) more or view all topics or full text. | 44 | 150 | 03/16/20 |
| 2701I | Region 2 Court Interpreter Employment Relations Committee 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The fundamental task in statutory construction is ascertaining the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. When interpreting a statute, PERB begins with its plain meaning, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and giving meaning to every word of the statute, if possible, to avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage. If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, PERB assumes the Legislature meant what it said. (pp, 32-33.) more or view all topics or full text. | 44 | 150 | 03/16/20 |
| 2660S | State of California (Office of the Inspector General) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The fundamental task in statutory construction is ascertaining the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. The Board first examines the statutory language, giving words their usual and ordinary meaning. If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we assume the Legislature meant what it said; the plain meaning of the language controls and there is nothing to interpret or construe. “The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.” [Citation.] If the statutory terms are ambiguous, then we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the purpose of the statute and the legislative history. (pp. 15-16.) more or view all topics or full text. | 44 | 48 | 08/15/19 |
| 2670M | County of Santa Clara 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The Legislature’s failure to address successorship in the MMBA does not mean it intended to prohibit application of the successorship doctrine to local public agencies. Legislative silence is not the equivalent of positive legislation. (p. 18.) Because the NLRA and MMBA similarly protect employees’ rights to bargain collectively through an employee representative of their own choosing and bar employers from refusing to negotiate with their employees’ chosen representative, there is no statutory reason to preclude application of the successorship doctrine in California’s public sector. (pp. 18-19.) However, differences between private and public sector employment require a more flexible accretion policy in the public sector to ensure that bargaining units are appropriately and rationally structured. (p. 19.) more or view all topics or full text. | 44 | 67 | 09/20/19 |
| 2670M | County of Santa Clara 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Though PERB may look to analogous federal precedent for guidance in construing California’s public sector labor relations statutes, it is not controlling authority. Thus, when federal law and the PERB-administered statutes serve dissimilar purposes, we are not constrained to follow federal precedent. (p. 28.) more or view all topics or full text. | 44 | 67 | 09/20/19 |
| 2556M | County of San Bernardino 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles A statutory right may be implied by the statute’s text and purposes. more or view all topics or full text. | 42 | 114 | 03/06/18 |
| 2556M | County of San Bernardino 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The Legislature’s use of one defined term rather than another in a particular statutory provision is significant when interpreting the provision. more or view all topics or full text. | 42 | 114 | 03/06/18 |
| 2556M | County of San Bernardino 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles To interpret one of its statutes, the Board looks to case law interpreting its other statutes, mindful that by vesting PERB with jurisdiction over the MMBA, the Legislature intended “a coherent and harmonious system of public employment relations laws.” (Coachella Valley Mosquito and Vector Control Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1090.) more or view all topics or full text. | 42 | 114 | 03/06/18 |
| 2556M | County of San Bernardino 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles A statute cannot be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with its purpose. more or view all topics or full text. | 42 | 114 | 03/06/18 |
| 2582M | City of Davis 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles It is appropriate to rely on precedent interpreting similar provisions of other California labor relations statutes. more or view all topics or full text. | 43 | 51 | 09/05/18 |
| 2566C | Los Angeles County Superior Court 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Statutes must be interpreted to avoid giving effect to drafting errors. more or view all topics or full text. | 43 | 1 | 06/12/18 |
| A466E | Grossmont Union High School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles In construing administrative regulations, PERB’s fundamental goal is to “give the regulatory language its plain, commonsense meaning. If the language is ambiguous, PERB may look to other sources of interpretation, including the purpose of the regulation, the legislative history, public policy, and the scheme of which the regulation is a part. PERB Regulation 32305(c) prohibits extensions of time in cases subject to subdivision (b) of the same regulation. For a case to fall under subdivision (b), it must satisfy two requirements, as indicated by the conjunctive “and” joining the two phrases of the introductory clause – the case must arise under one of the enumerated regulations and be one where exceptions to a proposed decision are filed after the formal hearing process. (p. 4) more or view all topics or full text. | 43 | 15 | 06/20/18 |
| 2518E | Los Angeles Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The Legislature’s specific exclusion of criteria and standards for evaluation in HEERA’s scope of representation suggests that it did not intend to exclude those matters from the scope of representation under EERA. more or view all topics or full text. | 41 | 146 | 03/06/17 |
| 2540M | City and County of San Francisco * * * VACATED IN PART by City and County of San Francisco (2019) PERB Decision No. 2540a-M 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles * * * VACATED IN PART ON OTHER GROUNDS by City & County of San Francisco (2019) PERB Decision No. 2540a-M. * * *Voters’ intent in adopting a charter amendment cannot be determined based on comments of amendment’s sponsor that were not communicated to the voters. more or view all topics or full text. | 42 | 50 | 10/20/17 |
| 2440E | Capistrano Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles EERA section 3543.1, subdivision (b), provides an independent right to employee organizations, not found in the federal law, to represent their members in their employment relations with the public school employer. When applying the Weingarten decision and other non-California authorities, they must be harmonized with the language and purposes of the PERB administered statutes. Where California statutes provide for broader rights not found in the federal law, the Board must follow the intent of the Legislature to effectuate the purposes of the statute. more or view all topics or full text. | 40 | 24 | 06/30/15 |
| A410M | County of Contra Costa 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The plain language of EERA and HEERA extends factfinding to negotiations over all matters within the scope of representation, not just to negotiations over new or successor CBAs. At the time AB 646 was passed, the Legislature is presumed to have known that PERB applied existing impasse resolution procedures to single-issue bargaining disputes, mid-term contract negotiations, and effects bargaining disputes, and that the duty of parties to meet and confer in good faith under MMBA covers more than simply the duty to meet and confer over the terms of an MOU. The Legislature did not intend that MMBA factfinding be limited only to bargaining disputes over comprehensive MOUs. Nothing in AB 646 interferes with the ultimate decision-making authority of public agencies to determine wages or manage its finances. more or view all topics or full text. | 38 | 154 | 04/16/14 |
| 2349M | Santa Clara Valley Water District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles PERB follows judicial authority and general rules of statutory construction, looking first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, affording the words their ordinary and usual meaning and giving meaning to every word of the statute, if possible, to avoid a construction that makes any word surplusage or ascribes to the Legislature the commission of a meaningless act. Only where the plain meaning of the statute is unclear will the Board turn to other sources to discern legislative intent, such as the legislative history or the wider historical circumstances of the statute’s enactment. more or view all topics or full text. | 38 | 96 | 12/19/13 |
| A419M | City and County of San Francisco 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles A single legislator’s comments, even the author's, cannot be relied on for legislative history, because they do not necessarily represent the intent of the Legislature as a whole. more or view all topics or full text. | 39 | 72 | 11/24/14 |
| 2332E | Santa Ana Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles PERB is not willing to import a requirement into a statute that the Legislature rejected. more or view all topics or full text. | 38 | 51 | 10/03/13 |
| A414M | County of Fresno 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The Legislature is presumed to have known when AB 646 was passed that PERB applied the impasse resolution procedures under EERA to single-issue bargaining disputes, mid-term contract negotiations and effects bargaining disputes. more or view all topics or full text. | 39 | 8 | 06/17/14 |
| 2263M | Central Contra Costa Transit Authority 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Legislative history documents communicated to the Legislature as a whole constitute evidence of legislative intent; Senate Rules Committee reports and analyses are cognizable legislative history; Office of the Senate Floor analyses are also cognizable legislative history. more or view all topics or full text. | 36 | 177 | 05/08/12 |
| 1957C | Tehama County Superior Court 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles When the Board is interpreting a statute section within its jurisdiction for the first time it will look to cases decided under the other statutes administered. Where “the similarity of language and purpose” is found, the Board will generally follow earlier decisions with similar issues. (State of California (California Department of Corrections) (1980) PERB Decision No. 127-S.) The Board uses its decisional authority to harmonize the various statutes where appropriate. (City of San Rafael (2004) PERB Decision No. 1698-M.) However, “in the face of strong evidence of a contrary intent,” the Board is “not free to rewrite the statute.” (Regents of University of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 937.) As one court has stated, “The Legislature would be rendered nearly powerless to make changes in law if we were to permit the Board to interpret this obvious change as a attempt to continue the same legal relationships” in the other statutes under its jurisdiction. (Ibid.) MMBA section 3507.5 contains a provision similar to Trial Court Employment Protection and Governance Act (TCEPGA) section 71637.1. This section of the MMBA has been interpreted to “merely [preclude] management from representing nonmanagement (sic) employees; the language does not preclude management from being represented by the [same] bargaining organization.” (Reinbold v. City of Santa Monica (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 433 (Reinbold).) Legislative intent consistent with the ALJ’s interpretation of Section 71637.1 is shown by the Legislature’s inclusion of a prohibition on employee organizations representing both management and non-management employees in EERA, HEERA and the Dills Act and the failure to include that prohibition in the TCEPGA. (See Regents of University of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 937, 945.) Additionally, when provisions in a statute have been judicially construed, a subsequent statute on the same subject, using the same language, is generally given a similar interpretation. (County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees’ Assn. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 564, 592; Moreland v. Department of Corporations (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 506, 512.) Such is the case regarding TCEPGA section 71637.1 which became effective January 1, 2001. (Added Stats. 2000, ch. 1010, sec. 14 (SB 2140). Section 71637.1 contains the same language as the MMBA section 3507.5, which has existed as presently written since being amended in 1969. (Added by Stats. 1968, ch. 1277, sec. 1.) In Reinbold, MMBA section 3507.5 was interpreted as follows: “Section 3507.5 merely precludes management from representing nonmanagement [sic] employees; the language does not preclude management from being represented by the bargaining organization. Any concern that there may be a conflict of interest between management and the other employees, is obviated by the fact that it is not management representing the employees.” The above-referenced interpretation of the identical language at issue in this case existed more than 30 years before the Legislature enacted TCEPGA section 71637.1. This suggests a legislative intent that Section 71637.1 should be similarly interpreted and we so hold. more or view all topics or full text. | 32 | 84 | 05/27/08 |
| 1958E | Grossmont-Cuyamaca Community College District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles In construing a statute, we begin with the fundamental rule that we should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 (Moyer); North Orange County Regional Occupational Program (1990) PERB Decision No. 857 (NOCROP.) “Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the construction intended by the Legislature is obvious from the language used.” (NOCROP and cases cited therein.) Additionally, statutes are to “be given a reasonable and common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers.” (DeYoung v. City of San Diego (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 11, 18; Inglewood Unified School District (1991) PERB Order No. Ad-222.) The reasonable and commonsense interpretation of the word “district” in the terms “district policies” and “district programs” in EERA section 3540.1(g) is that they are policies which have to be approved at the district level and programs which were created with district level approval. Moreover, we find there is no language in EERA which indicates the Legislature intended the words “district policies” to mean “district-wide policies.” The same is true under another well established cannon of judicial construction, that “every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.” (Joint Powers Board of Directors, Tulare County Organization for Vocational Education, Regional Occupational Center and Program (1978) PERB Decision No. 57 citing People v. Hacker Emporium, Inc. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 474, 477.) “Where the provisions of a statute are subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, that which will harmonize rather than conflict with other provisions thereof should be adopted.” (San Bernardino City Unified School District (1989) PERB Decision No. 723 citing People v. Kuhn (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 695, 698.) As a matter of statutory construction, “a word or phrase repeated in a statute should be given the same meaning throughout. [Citation omitted.]” (People v. Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 197, 205.) Giving the same meaning to “district policies” in both EERA sections 3540 and 3540.1(g), we find that the Legislature intended the term “district policies” in EERA section 3540.1(g) to mean any policy decision by community college district boards whether the policies apply district-wide or to individual colleges. We decline to reevaluate the conjunctive versus disjunctive issue regarding EERA section 3540.1(g) because the Legislature has indicated that it agrees with Lompoc Unified School District (1977) EERB Decision No. 13’s (Lompoc) interpretation. In doing so we are guided by the fundamental rule in construing a statute that the court (of PERB) should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (NOCROP citing Moyer.) In Sonoma County Bd. of Education v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 689, 700 (Sonoma), the reviewing court was tasked with interpreting the scope of a statute where the meaning and effect had earlier been analyzed in an opinion of the attorney general. Relevant to this case, the Sonoma court held that “the failure of the Legislature to amend the statute following publication of the Attorney General’s opinion supports an inference that the legislative intent therein was correctly construed [citations omitted] . . .” The Sonoma court noted with regard to opinions of the attorney general that such an official interpretation is not controlling but it is nevertheless entitled to great weight. (Sonoma, supra, at p. 699.) We opine that the same is true, if not more so, of PERB opinions given courts have uniformly held that PERB’s construction is to be regarded with deference by a court performing the judicial function of statutory construction, and will generally be followed unless it is clearly erroneous. (San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 850, 856.) We therefore find that the same inference can be drawn from the Legislature’s failure to amend a statute after PERB has interpreted the Legislature’s intent as to such statutory language. For the same reason we find that there is an inference that the Legislature’s intent is properly expressed in Lompoc as to EERA section 3540.1(g). The language of Section 3540.1(g) is the same today as it was when enacted in 1975. (Stats. 1975, ch. 961, sec. 2, p. 2248.) The Legislature has not amended it to have a meaning different than that articulated in Lompoc in 1977. This inference becomes even stronger with the Legislature’s use of the same disjunctive word, “or”, in its definition of management employee in HEERA. Notably, HEERA’s statutory provision defining “management employee” was enacted after PERB interpreted EERA section 3540.1(g) in Lompoc. more or view all topics or full text. | 32 | 85 | 05/29/08 |
| 1942C | Fresno County Superior Court * * * OVERRULED IN PART by County of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2315-M 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles * * * OVERRULED IN PART ON OTHER GROUNDS by County of Sacramento (2013) PERB Decision No. 2315-M. * * *If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, then the intent of the Legislature is reflected in the plain meaning of the statute. more or view all topics or full text. | 32 | 38 | 01/31/08 |
| 1916M | County of Imperial 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The MMBA allows a considerable degree of local regulation, but where it sets a standard, local divergence is not allowed. Thus, the standards established by the MMBA may not be undercut by contradictory rules or procedures that would frustrate its purposes. When looking at a disputed local rule, the inquiry does not concern whether PERB would find a different rule more reasonable. Rather, the question is whether the disputed local rule is consistent with and effectuates the purposes of the MMBA. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, then the intent of the Legislature is reflected in the plain meaning of the statute. more or view all topics or full text. | 31 | 120 | 06/28/07 |
| 1823Ha | Trustees of the California State University 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles On remand from published Court of Appeal decision, Board vacated February 23, 2006 decision in Trustees of the California State University (2006) PERB Decision No. 1823-H. Court of Appeal found no violation of HEERA. more or view all topics or full text. | 32 | 53 | 02/14/08 |
| 1816M | Antelope Valley Health Care District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles When statute is clear and unambiguous, the intent of the Legislature is reflected in the plain meaning of the statute and it is unnecessary to look at Legislative history. A recognized rule of statutory construction is that the expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed. more or view all topics or full text. | 30 | 60 | 02/10/06 |
| 1622M | Westlands Water District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles In evaluating a charge, the plain language of a statute or rule will be accepted where it is clear and unambiguous. more or view all topics or full text. | 28 | 144 | 04/22/04 |
| 1581M | County of Sacramento 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles In the interpreting contract bar ordinance of County, PERB looks for guidance to the practices of the NLRB. As a legislative enactment, however, County ordinance it is not subject to discretionary application “to waive or apply it in order to effectuate its policy underpinnings.” (NLRB v. Circle A&W Products Co., supra., 647 F.2d 924.) Rather, interpretation of ordinance must be approached as with a statute in an effort to ascertain the intent of the legislative body so as to effectuate the purposes of the law. more or view all topics or full text. | 28 | 57 | 01/09/04 |
| 1570M | County of San Joaquin 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles It is well-settled that a Board agent must accept the plain language of the contract or rule where it is clear and unambiguous. However, where the contract language or rule is unclear or ambiguous, the Board has held that the parties should be given an opportunity to offer evidence to support their differing interpretations at an evidentiary hearing. In light of union’s factual allegations, Board cannot find the local rule at issue to be clear and unambiguous. To the contrary, the local rule appears to be reasonably susceptible to the interpretation offered by the union. Accordingly, union has established a prima facie case and a complaint should issue. more or view all topics or full text. | 28 | 37 | 12/19/03 |
| 1467Ea | San Diego Community College District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Absent a clear indication of intent from the legislative history, the Board must follow the plain language of the statue. more or view all topics or full text. | 27 | 55 | 04/18/03 |
| A280E | Alum Rock Union Elementary School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Where case hinges on strict application of a clearly worded statute, prejudice to a party is not considered by the Board; p. 8, fn. 8. more or view all topics or full text. | 21 | 28023 | 12/06/96 |
| A246S | State of California (Department of Personnel Administration) (California Union of Safety Employees) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles It is appropriate to apply the rules of statutory construction to determine the meaning of regulations and when the meaning of terms is ambiguous. more or view all topics or full text. | 17 | 24102 | 05/18/93 |
| A222E | Inglewood Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Statutes are to be given a reasonable and common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent intention of the lawmakers. more or view all topics or full text. | 15 | 22110 | 06/24/91 |
| A209E | Apple Valley Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Not within the Board's authority to adopt contract bar rules that are inconsistent with the express language of the statute; qualifying phrases must be applied to the words immediately preceding them; p. 10. more or view all topics or full text. | 14 | 21121 | 06/14/90 |
| 1138Eb | Barstow Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles If language is not ambiguous, the plain meaning of the language governs its interpretation. Every work should be given meaning leaving no part as surplus. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be found if statutes can be rationally harmonized; pp. 17-18. more or view all topics or full text. | 21 | 28068 | 03/20/97 |
| 1103E | Laguna Salada Union School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The Board's statutory remedial powers cannot be limited or constrained by stipulation of the parties; p. 17. more or view all topics or full text. | 19 | 26095 | 05/11/95 |
| 0868E | Whisman Elementary School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Rule of statutory construction states that expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves the exclusion of other things not expressed; p. 13. Where EERA and the Education Code address same or similar subjects, the Board seeks a resolution which harmonizes the legislative intent underlying both; p. 13. more or view all topics or full text. | 15 | 22043 | 02/14/91 |
| 0857E | North Orange County Regional Occupational Program * * * SUPERSEDED by amendment to EERA section 3540.1, subdivision (k), Stats. 1999, Ch. 828 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles * * * SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS by Stats. 1999, ch. 828 (A.B. 631), § 5.5. * * *The fundamental rule is for a court to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. Where no ambiguity exists, the intent of the Legislature is to be gleaned from the words of the statute itself, according to the usual and ordinary import of the language. An administrative agency may not alter or amend a statute or enlarge its scope where a statute enumerates things upon which it is to operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect, all those not expressly mentioned. The function of the word "or" is to mark an alternative such as "either this or that." Every word in a statute is intended and a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided. more or view all topics or full text. | 15 | 22010 | 12/17/90 |
| 0852E | Los Angeles Unified School District (Watts) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Use of word "shall" in statute normal imposts that its provisions are mandatory in nature; p. 5. Recognized rule of statutory construction is that expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed; p. 5. more or view all topics or full text. | 14 | 21220 | 11/28/90 |
| 0805Hb | Trustees of the California State University (Statewide University Police Association) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Plain language of HEERA section 3563.2 provides PERB has initial, exclusive jurisdiction over unfair practices; pp. 7-8, fn. 9. more or view all topics or full text. | 14 | 21217 | 11/14/90 |
| 0787S | State of California (Department of Personnel Administration) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The Dills Act must be construed in a manner which leaves intact its constitutionality and which gives the plain meaning to the words of the statute. Because the Dills Act was enacted with the merit principles, as defined in the Constitution, clearly in mind, as long as the application of 3513(c) does not run counter to the constitutional provisions regarding civil service, there is no conflict. more or view all topics or full text. | 14 | 21040 | 01/11/90 |
| 0730H | Regents of the University of California (Association of Graduate Student Employees) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Where language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the construction intended by the Legislature is obvious from the language used. The Board compared "educational objective" to actual "services performed" to determine which was "subordinate" per Gov. Code 3562(f); pp. 29-31. The term "educational objectives" encompasses more than a desire to get a degree and more than career goals and the Board will not confine itself to looking solely at subjective opinions of the students, but will consider the mutual objectives of the U.C. and the students; pp. 37-40. more or view all topics or full text. | 13 | 20087 | 04/26/89 |
| 0723E | San Bernardino City Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Where a statute is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations the interpretation which will harmonize rather than conflict with other provisions should be adopted; p. 13, proposed dec. more or view all topics or full text. | 13 | 20060 | 03/03/89 |
| 0685E | Hacienda La Puente Unified School District * * * SUPERSEDED by amendment to EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (a) Stats. 1989, Ch. 313 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles * * * SUPERSEDED ON OTHER GROUNDS by Stats. 1989, ch. 313, § 2. * * *Statutory construction used only where term is ambiguous; p. 17. more or view all topics or full text. | 12 | 19113 | 06/24/88 |
| 0356H | Regents of the University of California (Statewide University Police Association) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Construction of statute by employer is unduly narrow, requires incongruous inference legislature intended same phrase have two different meanings. more or view all topics or full text. | 7 | 14288 | 11/14/83 |
| 0325E | Long Beach Unified School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Board has duty to harmonize Education Code and EERA. more or view all topics or full text. | 7 | 14193 | 07/08/83 |
| 0211H | California State University, Sacramento 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Overall statutory scheme of HEERA preserves representation rights for employees and non-exclusive employee organizations until such time as an exclusive representative is selected. The basic rationale of SEERA as expressed in Professional Engineers in California Government (3/19/80) PERB Decision No. 118-S, applies to HEERA: the statute generally expands the rights of employees over those possessed under Brown Act.; pp. 28-31. more or view all topics or full text. | 6 | 13115 | 04/30/82 |
| 0212H | Regents of the University of California (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles The language of HEERA and its overall statutory scheme provide a clear indication that the Legislature did not intend to consign nonexclusive representatives to a state of powerless limbo when it enacted HEERA. A provision of general application contained in EERA or SEERA not provided for similarly or identically in HEERA does not mean that the policy embodied by such provision is not applicable to HEERA; pp. 6-7. HEERA's express provisions indicate a legislative intent to preserve representation rights for employees and employee organizations until such time as an exclusive representative is selected; p. 7. Subsection 3560(e) makes clear the Legislature's intention that designation of nonexclusive representatives is an integral part of the statutory scheme; pp. 7-8. The statutory language of subsection 3565 separates meeting and statutory scheme; pp. 7-8. The statutory language of subsection 3565 separates meeting and represented by nonexclusive representatives prior to selection of an exclusive representative. The very definition of the term "employee organization" at subsection 3562(g) further indicates that the Legislature contemplated that nonexclusive representatives would "deal with" the higher education employer regarding employment matters. Otherwise, the Legislature would have limited the definition accordingly, rather than including within that definition " . . . any organization of any kind . . . ."; pp. 9-10. more or view all topics or full text. | 6 | 13116 | 04/30/82 |
| 0202E | Chaffey Joint Union High School District (Fleck) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Where the provisions of state acts are indentical or substantially similar to those of existing federal statutes, the inference may be drawn that the State Legislature intended that the state laws be interpreted and applied in accordance with federal precedent; p. 6. more or view all topics or full text. | 6 | 13077 | 03/26/82 |
| 0133E | Jefferson School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Section 3540 does not prohibit negotiation of issues that are covered in the Ed. Code as long as those provisions are not explicitly precluded by the Ed. Code; the exclusion of provisions which mirror the Ed. Code does not violate the supercession provision of EERA. more or view all topics or full text. | 4 | 11117 | 06/19/80 |
| 0043E | Westminster School District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Exact phraseology used in a particular section is not as significant as the general tenor and scope of the entire act. Rule of Noscitur a Sociis, the meaning of a particular word may be enlarged by reference to the object or purpose of the whole clause in which it is used. more or view all topics or full text. | 2 | 2006 | 12/16/77 |
| 0042E | Westminster School District (Zaikowsky) 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Words of statute will be given a literal interpretation unless absurd consequences result. more or view all topics or full text. | 2 | 2007 | 12/16/77 |
| 0018E | Los Rios Community College District * * * OVERRULED IN PART by Hartnell Community College District (1979) PERB Decision No. 81 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles * * * OVERRULED IN PART ON OTHER GROUNDS by Hartnell Community College District (1979) PERB Decision No. 81. * * *Exclusions from a board grant of rights by the legislature must be strictly construed, language of section 3540.1(c) will be viewed narrowly. more or view all topics or full text. | 1 | 185 | 06/09/77 |
| 0077E | Peralta Community College District 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles Purpose of statute presumed to be preserved; interpretation should not ascribe to Legislature the commission of a meaningless act; p. 8. Rejected bills have little value as evidence of legislative intent; p. 12. more or view all topics or full text. | 2 | 2214 | 11/17/78 |
| 0057E | Tulare County Organization for Vocational Education, Regional Occupational Center and Program, Joint Powers Board of Directors, 1407.01000: GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; General Principles ...every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect...Such purpose will not be sacrificed to a literal construction of any part of the Act...; p. 5. more or view all topics or full text. | 2 | 2136 | 06/26/78 |